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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis finds that the African regional response to mitigate terrorist threats in 
Mali and the Sahel region of West Africa has been more successful than Mali’s local 
efforts for reasons that cannot be unconnected from the collaborative efforts of regional 
players who presided at diplomatic engagements, shared intelligence, and participated in 
combat operations against terrorists. However, terrorists continue to pose isolated threats 
to Mali and the Sahel. The African regional bodies can curtail the threats through joint 
military operations by an established joint standby regional force, sound regional border 
security coordination and management practices, effective intelligence gathering and 
sharing procedures, and reform of the Malian armed forces to adequately step in and 
robustly replace the regional forces when they scale down operations in the near future. 
The African regional bodies have obtained support from their partners—the United 
Nations, European Union, France, and the United States, among others—and can explore 
the possibility of obtaining additional resources from the partners when the joint regional 
standby force is established. However, the extent to which a regional force will be 
successful depends on its counterterrorist response, its exposure to various types of 
weapons and equipment, and the degree of its professionalism. The conditions in the 
Sahel are right for an improved regional response to terror. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Sahel Region of West Africa has experienced planned and systematic terrorist 
attacks that have threatened the peace and security of the affected states and the region. 
Terrorists have attacked Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Indeed, Mali has experienced more 
terrorist attacks than any other West African state; between 1990 and 2014, some 199 
terrorist attacks in Mali killed a total of 725 people, including 178 perpetrators.1 
Throughout the region, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has orchestrated these 
attacks, and it maintains links with its affiliates—the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant , 
Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab, among others. In response, the United Nations (UN), 
African Union (AU), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have 
stepped in to render assistance in the fight against terrorism. There have been some 
successes, yet terrorism lingers in the region and much remains to be done.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis aims to answer the question: What should regional organizations do 
differently to combat the threat of terrorism in the Sahel more effectively? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH QUESTION 
This project hopes to contribute to the broader knowledge about countering 
terrorism in Africa, particularly in the Sahel, as well as to the growing study of regional 
and multinational organizations. This investigation is relevant to policymakers in the 
region in that its recommendations are meant to help them better devise policies aimed at 
combating terrorist activities more effectively, thereby saving lives, property, and billions 
of dollars that would be expended to manage effects of terrorism and reconstruct post-
terrorism environments. This research is also useful to regional bodies across the globe in 
their efforts to formulate policies on issues of terrorism.  
 
1 “Terrorism in Mali,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
2015, https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_MaliFactSheet_Nov2015.pdf. 
2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this literature review, I examine scholarly works on regionalism globally and in 
the Sahel Region of West Africa. I am mindful that researchers have attributed the growth 
of regionalism to the demise of the Cold War and the bipolar world order that it imposed. 
These researchers include Giovanni Barbieri, Edward D. Mansfield, and Etel Solingen. 
According to Barbieri, regionalism originated in the aftermath of World War II and 
gradually evolved until the post-Cold War.2 Mansfield and Solingen quote Buzan, Weaver, 
Lake, and Morgan who maintain that, “the decline of bipolarity and movement toward 
multipolarity enabled regional arrangements that could not have surfaced during the Cold 
War.”3 Mansfield and Solingen’s stance is significant because, following the demise of 
bipolarity, the world became a global village with states more frequently cooperating 
regionally to address such issues of mutual concern as mitigation of terrorism, which this 
thesis examines.  
Regionalism can be linked to the international relations (IR) theories of liberalism, 
realism, and constructivism. Authors whose literary work has elements of the major IR 
paradigms are Borzel and Risse, Mansfield and Solingen, and Nyesiga, whose submissions 
explore the role of regionalism in the promotion of peace and development. This literature 
review throws light on regionalism, with focus placed on the advent of regionalism, general 
perspectives of regionalism, and regionalism’s new focus, to indicate the transformation of 
regionalism from addressing minimal to myriad challenges confronting states. Given the 
wave of terrorism in the world, regionalism’s transformation is timely for restoring order 
in the universe.  
1. The Advent of Regionalism  
On the one hand, regionalism—in the sense of an association of neighboring 
states—has more than a century of history in Africa. According to McKeever, “one, the 
 
2 Giovanni Barbieri, “Regionalism, Globalism and Complexity: A Stimulus Towards Global IR?” 
Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 4, no. 6 (November 2019): 425, 10.1080/23802014.2019.1685406. 
3 Edward D. Mansfield and Etel Solingen, “Regionalism,” Annual Review of Political Science 13, no. 
1 (June 2010): 158, 10.1146/annurev.polisci.13.050807.161356. 
3 
oldest international agreement in the region and the oldest customs union in the world, is 
the Southern African Customs Union.”4 Similarly, a handful of regional organizations 
elsewhere in the world existed even in the 1940s, although they were not too coherent. For 
example, Meyer notes that in 1948, the Organization of American States was formed as a 
platform for the deliberation on matters of collective concern by states in the hemisphere,5 
and the Arab League in 1945 as a regional political organization to secure the interest of 
Arab countries.6  
On the other hand, the Cold War period and the post–Cold War period witnessed 
the gradual evolution of regionalism.7 According to Barbieri, “during each period, 
regionalism has been influenced by the political and ideological contexts of the time.”8 
However, in the 1990s, regionalism adopted a new focus to address the myriad of 
challenges experienced since its inception. 
2. General Perspectives on Regionalism  
Regionalism is established because states cannot operate in isolation, given the 
anarchic nature of international systems,9 as postulated by realist political philosophers. 
According to Borzel and Risse, “states have used regional institutions to gain leverage in 
international negotiations on market access.”10 Borzel and Risse here assume a liberal 
 
4 Matthew McKeever, “Regional Institutions and Social Development in Southern Africa,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 34, no. 1 (August 2008): 458, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/
annurev.soc.34.040507.134645. 
5 Peter J. Meyer, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report 
No. R42639 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 1, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R42639.pdf.  
6 İrfan Kaya Ulger and Joe Hammoura, “The Arab League: From Establishment to Failure,” Journal of 
Social and Legal Studies (July 2018): 35–37, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
326783428_The_Arab_League_From_Establishment_to_Failure. 
7 Giovanni Barbieri, “Regionalism, globalism and complexity: A stimulus towards global IR?,” Third 
World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 4, no. 6, (2019), 425, DOI: 10.1080/23802014.2019.1685406.  
8 Barbieri, “Regionalism, globalism and complexity.” 
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (London: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
1979), 103. 
10 Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, “Grand Theories of Integration and the Challenges of 
Comparative Regionalism,” Journal of European Public Policy 26, no. 8 (2019):1239, DOI: 10.1080/
13501763.2019.1622589,1239. 
4 
posture in attributing the establishment of regionalism to the desire of attaining economic 
influences to depict the necessity of regionalism in promoting economic growth. However, 
promotion of economic growth is only one segment of regionalism.    
Mansfield and Solingen share a similar view and catalogue the reasons for the 
formation of regional organizations. They quote Keohane: 
Institutions are expected to reduce uncertainty, enhance information about 
preferences and behavior, lower transaction costs responsible for market 
failure, monitor compliance, detect defections, increase opportunities for 
cooperation, reduce the costs of retaliation, facilitate issue linkages, and 
offer focal points or salient solutions.11 
Arguably, Mansfield and Solingen are of the view that regionalism helps states 
obtain fair terms of trade and economic opportunities. However, they do not elaborate on 
how regionalism manages or accommodates non-state actors like multinational 
corporations and firms that produce commodities.  
For Gruel and Hout, regionalism can be seen as an attempt by the state and/or 
domestic actors to affect and influence the course of globalization within their regional 
sphere.12 Gruel and Hout’s agreement that states participate in regionalism to impact 
globalization may be partly correct, as globalization offers opportunities to states. 
However, there are winners and losers in globalization, with winners being those who 
invest resources in trade and manage their investments well.13 Nevertheless, regionalism 
helps states obtain grants, loans, and investors who provide job opportunities for the 
people. Arguably, job opportunities offer financial resources needed to prop up families 
and limit the rate of participation in extremist activities. Similarly, job opportunities 
provide socialization through which employees inculcate the ethos of the jobs and reject 
 
11 Mansfield and Solingen, “Regionalism,” 157. 
12 Jean Gruel and Wil Hout, “Regionalism Across the North-South Divide, States Strategies and 
Globalization” (London: Routledge, 1999, 11, https://www.amazon.com/Regionalism-across-North-South-
Divide-ebook/dp/B000SJWUHO. 
13 Kimberley Clausing, Open the Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and Global Capital 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 73.  
5 
threat-prone activities. That said, regionalism offers member states the required expertise 
to help develop and advise on national programs.  
Nyesiga takes the debate forward and presents a realist argument that, as Kupchan, 
Solomon, and Cilliers observe:  
The underlying logic of collective security is twofold. First, is that the 
balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent 
war and stop aggression far more effectively than balancing mechanism in 
an anarchic setting…. Second, a collective security organization, by 
institutionalizing the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of 
an international setting in which stability emerges through cooperation 
rather than competition.14 
In the above submission, Nyesiga throws light on the collaborative efforts of states in the 
mitigation of war and refers to states’ concerted efforts to curb security threats more 
effectively.  
In addition to the liberal lens initially used, Borzel and Risse assume a constructivist 
lens in their submission that “the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was created based 
on a strong post-colonial elite identity emphasizing African independence and a strong 
non-intervention norm.”15 Although the OAU’s non-intervention norm depicts 
noninterference in African political matters, it “provide [s] a solid foundation for peaceful 
and positive cooperation among States”16 on matters of mutual concern, particularly 
terrorism.       
3. Regionalism’s New Focus 
Regionalism’s new focus does not imply that inter-governmental relations are no 
longer relevant. They are indeed relevant and utilized in the new dispensation alongside 
 
14 Nicholas Humble Nyesiga, “Combating Transnational Terrorism in the East African Region: The 
Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2017), 7–8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55509. 
15Borzel and Risse, “Grand Theories of Integration and the Challenges of Comparative Regionalism,” 
1242. 
16 OAU Charter, 1, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-oau_charter_1963.pdf.  
6 
the new actors. Another new initiative in regionalism is human security.17 Grant and 
Soderbaum claim that human security is a shift away from a narrow state-centric notion of 
security to a broader, more encompassing one.18 Arguably, human security entails 
measures employed to promote daily sustenance and economic and physical wellbeing, 
among others, mindful that abject or sustained need can drive a person to extremism, 
violence, or criminality. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Regional organizations can better combat terrorism if they have the correct policies 
and strategies and collaborate with host communities. I hypothesize that regional 
organizations with established policies and strategies that include intelligence sharing, 
inter-state collaborations, and harmonized border security procedures mitigate terrorism. 
This hypothesis asserts that a regional organization with the correct direction and team will 
succeed in the fight against terrorism. The independent variable is “regional organization” 
while the dependent variable is “mitigate terrorism.” The hypothesis illustrates the need 
for having correct strategies and guidelines and the significance of teamwork in the 
promotion of national security. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer the research question, this thesis uses a single case study analysis—Mali. 
First, this thesis investigates the terrorist threats in Mali, followed by an overview and 
analysis of Mali’s and regional organizations’ endeavors to combat the terrorist threats. To 
conclude, this thesis provides recommendations to policymakers in the region for 
strengthening regional responses to terrorism. 
This thesis draws on a range of sources: textbooks, journals, reports, and 
government policies, including those from established international organizations. Other 
pertinent materials consulted in the preparation of the thesis are internet materials and 
 
17 Frederik Soderbaum and Andrew Grant, “New Regionalism in Africa,” Research Gate (January 
2003), 9, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259580724_New_Regionalism_in_Africa 
18 Soderbaum and Grant, “New Regionalism in Africa,” 9. 
7 
reports from credible news outlets that are relevant to the research for critical examination 
of the views of authors on the research topic. The thesis analyzes data from these sources 
in qualitative rather than quantitative terms to promote critical thinking, a novel point of 
view, and ease of reading and comprehension by those who may access the work for design 
of policies on terrorism or further research on the subject matter.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is segmented into five chapters, as indicated below: 
Chapter I is the introduction. It entails the research question, significance of the 
research, literature review, hypothesis, research design, and thesis overview.  
Chapter II provides an overview of terrorism in Mali. It gives the background, 
nature, and composition of Mali’s terrorist groups and the factors responsible for terrorism 
in Mali.   
Chapter III examines Mali’s response to terrorism. It throws light on the efforts of 
Mali’s government and its operatives in the fight against terrorism. The chapter further 
encompasses policies enacted, strategies rolled out, and tactical operations undertaken in 
the mitigation of terrorism.  
Chapter IV examines responses from the regional organization, AU, and its sub-
regional body, ECOWAS. It investigates the extent to which the actors have helped 
mitigate terrorism in Mali and analyzes gaps in the response.  
Chapter V is the conclusion. It provides an analysis of regional actors’ responses to 
terrorism and proffers recommendations to mitigate the threats more effectively.  
8 
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II. OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM IN MALI 
Mali—indeed, the Sahel Region of West Africa—is plagued with terrorism, which, 
in turn, is exacerbated by regional/supranational, environmental, and economic challenges. 
Moreover, Mali’s vulnerabilities to terrorism are heightened by its vast land, which is 
threatened by drought and deforestation that result in inadequate water supply, poor 
agricultural productivity, and economic gloom. Mali’s borders are porous, largely because 
its national security operatives cannot effectively secure the state amid logistical 
inadequacies, limited manpower, and ineptitude. These problems mirror the issues that 
afflict the entire region; in fact, many of them can only be explained in the regional context.     
This chapter is segmented into two sections. First, this chapter throws light on 
Mali’s terrorist threats and terrorist organizations; then, the analysis turns to an 
examination of Mali’s vulnerabilities, both human and geographical. This context informs 
and explains the insecurity of Mali and the Sahel.  
A. THREATS OF TERRORISM IN MALI  
Mali’s threats of terrorism are authored by terrorist groups that operate within the 
Sahel Region of West Africa. They include AQIM, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front 
(FLM), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Jamaat Nasr al-
Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), among others. These groups originated from the Sahel where 
they affiliated with al Qaeda or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), presumably to be 
globally recognized as potently dangerous and a threat to the world. Since 2012, Mali has 
experienced systematic and sporadic terrorist attacks with a surge in terrorism in recent 
years. There have been severe terrorist attacks with the use of arms or explosives on state 
security operatives, peacekeepers, international dignitaries, and harmless and defenseless 
civilians. In 2020 alone, terrorist attacks in Mali have been decidedly deadly. For example, 
on March 19, 2020, armed men ambushed a Malian army camp in Gao, northern Mali, 
killing at least 29 soldiers and wounding at least five others.19 Although these groups attack 
 
19 Counter Extremism Project, “Mali: Extremism and Counter-Extremism,” 5, Accessed, August 3, 
2020, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/ML-08242020.pdf. 
10 
Mali, their activities are not limited to Mali. Rather, they are also experienced in the Sahel, 
with different states in the region having their portion of attacks. Terrorist groups have 
severely attacked Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania. For example, between 
January and July 2020, there were 85 attacks on teachers, students, and schools in Burkina 
Faso, Mali, and Niger.20 According to Lederer, “terrorist attacks have increased five-fold 
in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since 2016 with over 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 
compared to an estimated 770 deaths in 2016.”21 The wave of terrorism across the Sahel 
is worrisome, as the Sahel remains unsafe. Given the crisscrossing of terrorists and the 
wave of attacks they unleash in the Sahel, it can be argued that the threats are not local and 
cannot be effectively curbed by local solutions.  
Like their affiliates, Mali’s terrorist groups are opposed to non-Islamic practices 
and perceive the West as adversaries. However, Mali’s terrorist attacks do not necessarily 
reflect the ideology of Malian terrorists given that they are generic rather than selective, as 
no religious faith is excluded from their vicious strikes. For example, on March 2019, 
terrorists dressed as Dogan hunters killed more than 160 ethnic Fulani civilians, including 
children and pregnant women in the village of Ogossagou, Central Mali.22 With the March 
2019 terrorist attack on Mali’s ethnic Fulani civilians, Mali’s terrorists reflected their 
global affiliates (al Qaeda and ISIS) in being destructive, deceptive, and without regard for 
human rights principles, specifically right to life. However, attacks have even rolled into 
2020. In March 2020, terrorists attacked a convoy in Aguelhoc, Northern Mali, which 
resulted in the death of three UN peacekeepers.23 Also, in November 2020, terrorists killed 
eight civilians in an attack on a minibus between Paron and Songobai in the Bandagara 
 
20 Human Rights Watch, Attacks on Students, Teachers and Schools, Surge in Africa Sahel, September 
8, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/08/attacks-students-teachers-and-schools-surge-africas-sahel#.  
21 Edith M. Liderer, “UN Envoy: Terrorists Attacks Surging in Sahel and West Africa,” AP News, 
January 8, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/c8481aae55ca1a13aebdf34c9fe12595.  
22 James Blake, “Radical Islamist Have Opened a New Front in Mali,” FP News, March 29, 2019, 
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circle in Mopti region, Mali.24 That said, Mali’s terrorists, like their affiliates, attack where 
they are likely to obtain success and the desired impact.  
1. Background of Terrorist Threats in Mali 
The 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and the civil conflict that ensued attracted 
Islamist extremists who allied with the Tuareg rebels to perpetuate violence in Northern 
Mali. According to Lecocq et al., the formation of a new Tuareg political movement—the 
National Movement of Azawad—in October 2010 and the proclamation of an independent 
Azawad Republic in Mali fueled the civil conflict.25 Since Mali obtained independence in 
1960, the Tuareg tribe has been dissatisfied and aggrieved by state authorities and has 
rebelled several times (in 1963, 1991, 2006, and 2012) to secede from Mali and establish 
an independent Tuareg state, “Azawad.” Terrorists exploited one such secessionist conflict 
in 2012 to recruit combatants and fight alongside the Tuaregs. As a result of the Tuareg-
terrorist coalition, terrorists were able to overpower Mali’s weak and ill-equipped armed 
forces and temporarily control Northern Mali, where they introduced shariah law.26 
Commenting on the conflict between the Malian government and the Tuaregs, Sow notes 
that, at the beginning of the conflict, the jihadist groups never publicly showed their support 
for the secessionist fighters and quotes Charbonneau:  
Terrorist groups divided northern and central Mali into delineated areas of 
operations: Timbuktu was under AQIM; Kidal was controlled by Ansar 
Dine; FLM controlled the center in Segou and Mopti; the Ivory Coast border 
was controlled by an unnamed group; and Al-Mourabitoune was suspected 
of having moved to Libya, but it resurfaced in Mali and Burkina Faso with 
shocking attacks on both capitals.27  
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(June 9, 2013):1−2, DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2013.799063. 
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The Tuareg’s rebellion of 2012 is significant because it unraveled the capacity of terrorists, 
brought them to the limelight globally, and portrayed what their goals were given their 
brief leadership of Northern Mali and spate of horror experienced during that period.  
Mali’s influx of terrorists can further be attributed to the demise of the Libyan 
leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, and return of his Tuareg fighters to Mali. The Libyan 
leader provided employment for impoverished Tuaregs as mercenaries under his command 
and offered them huge salaries, homes, and cars with oil.28 According to Durmaz, these 
Tuareg combatants projected Qaddafi’s power in the region by fighting for him for decades 
from Lebanon to Niger and Mali.29 Following Qaddafi’s death, these combatants returned 
to their native home (Northern Mali) with sophisticated weaponry.30 According to Boas 
and Utas, in Mali, the returning Tuaregs returned home with quantities of weapons 
collected from the arsenal that nobody controlled when the Qaddafi state crumbled.31 
According to Lymmaouri, following the demise of the Libyan leader, “rebels, militias and 
criminal gangs looted Libyan arms caches, utilizing them for self-protection, fighting the 
Qaddafi regime, or sold them via the black market to armed groups.”32  
Additionally, the death of the Libyan leader has made Libya a harbor of refuge for 
fleeing terrorists. According to Boas and Utas, following the death of the Libyan leader, 
Islamist insurgents fleeing from international intervention in Mali took refuge in Libya’s 
South Fezzan region to regroup and launch attacks on Mali.33 Arguably, Libya has been 
used as an illicit base for fleeing terrorists because of its proximity to Mali and security 
 
28 Mucahid Durmaz, “Libya in the African Context,” TRT World Magazine, January 24, 2020, 
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/libya-in-the-african-context-33208.  
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Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center, April 2013), 4, https://www.academia.edu/12186299/
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31 Morten Boas and Mats Utas, “Introduction: Post-Gaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel and West 
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shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/04boasandutaspp315.pdf. 
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33 Boas and Utas, “Introduction: Post-Gaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel and West Africa,” 5. 
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pitfalls experienced in that state since the downfall—and death—of Qaddafi. Given that 
some of the Tuareg terrorists have served in Qaddafi’s military forces, it is likely that they 
are very familiar with the terrain, as well as military tactics, and therefore have used Libya 
for cover whenever international forces pursue them.  
2. Mali’s Terrorist Organizations  
Terrorist organizations that operate in Mali have similar ideologies and incentives 
to their affiliates, mainly al Qaeda and ISIS. Their common ideology is to establish an 
Islamic caliphate and enforce shariah law in the Maghreb.34 These groups have mostly 
emerged from existing groups in the Sahel Region of West Africa, where they dwell and 
attack neighboring states and have been fused with others to become potent. For example, 
the Islamist group Ansar Dine established FLM and the Katibat Khalid Ibn Walid,35 while 
the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) was formed through fusion of different 
terrorist groups in an area known as the zone of the three borders (Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Niger).36 Although different terrorist groups have operated in Mali at diverse dates, the 
main terrorist organizations in that country are AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, JNIM, and 
ISGS.  
3. AQIM  
AQIM is a terrorist organization in the Sahel Region of West Africa that continues 
to pose threat to Mali and its periphery. The Algerian civil war produced AQIM in reaction 
to a military coup that cancelled an election that a broad Islamist movement won.37 AQIM 
moved into Mali at the turn of the millennium, became affiliated with al Qaeda on 
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September 11, 2006, and had its name rebranded from the Salafist Group for Preaching 
and Combat to AQIM in January 2007.38 AQIM might have affiliated with al Qaeda for 
financial and logistical support. However, ideological motives cannot be ruled out as 
another reason for that affiliation. Like al Qaeda and its affiliated groups, AQIM’s 
incentives for operating as a terrorist organization include expelling western forces from 
that region39 and saving countries from the arms of those criminal governments that 
betrayed their people and religion.40 Here, AQIM assumes a religious posture that is 
contrary to the tenets of Islam, which it professes to propagate. To achieve its aims, AQIM 
fought alongside the Tuareg group in its rebellion of the northern region against Malian 
leadership. Also, it teamed up with other terrorist groups, mainly Ansar Dine and MUJAO, 
to take control of the north and chase the Malian military and state officials out of that 
region to make it an Islamic state.41 That said, AQIM’s terrorist activities in Mali can be 
seen as a response to Sayyid Qutb’s request for jihad against apostasy. In his literary work 
Milestone, Qutb asks “Muslims to separate themselves from mainstream society and 
engage in violent jihad [against apostasy].”42 In Qutb’s request for action against apostasy, 
he appears to be myopic in determining what is correct for the world. In a nutshell, it can 
be argued that Qutb sees jihad as an obligation for Muslims to purge out or cleanse states 
from infidels or nonbelievers.  
4. Ansar Dine 
Ansar Dine, also referred to as Defenders of Faith, is another Islamist extremist 
group operating within Mali from its base at Mali, with its membership drawn mostly from 
members of the Tuareg group. Ansar Dine is associated with AQIM and has a veteran rebel 
leader, Iyad Ag Ghaly, who founded the group in 2011–2012 in the framework of the crisis 
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in Mali.43 Ansar Dine was among the coalition of jihadist groups that allied with the Tuareg 
separatists in their rebellion to take control of northern Mali. Like most other Islamist 
groups, Ansar Dine believes in sharia, and those accused of adultery have been stoned to 
death, thieves have had limbs amputated, and social activities have been banned in areas 
under its control.44 The Daily Mail press notes that “the group has also demolished most of 
the ancient city’s shrines to Muslim saints, which the jihadists consider idolatrous.”45 
According to Dentice, in 2015, “the group expanded its network in the central and southern 
regions of Mali, establishing new Jihadist groups: the Macina Liberation Front and the 
katibat Khalid Ibn Walid.”46 
5. The Macina Liberation Front (FLM) 
Another Islamist group that has played a prominent role in Mali is the FLM. 
Amadou Koufa founded the FLM in 2013 to reinstate the theocratic Macina Empire 
experienced in Segou, Mopti and Timbuktu, Mali from 1818 to 1863.47 Like most other 
Islamist extremist group in Mali, the FLM applies Islamic rule across its territories 
presumably to gain support from the locals, given that the bulk of Malians are Muslims. 
That said, FLM is closely linked to Ansar Dine and its chief, Iyad Ag Ghaly, and comprises 
combatants from mostly the Fulani ethnic group. According to Pauline Le Roux, “in 2018, 
the FLM was linked to 63 percent of all violent events in central Mali and a third of violent 
events in the whole of Mali.”48 From 2013 to 2018, the FLM “has been responsible for the 
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kidnappings of many military members and government workers, the burning of villages 
and food stores in Dogon and of Bambara ethnic group’s villages.”49 
6. Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) 
MUJAO is one of the radical Islamist Salafist extremist groups in Mali that came 
into existence as a splinter group from AQIM, following its abduction of three 
humanitarian workers from a Saharan refugee camp in Tindouf on October 23, 2011.50 
Hamad el Khairy and Ahmed el Tilemsi founded MUJAO to spread jihadism in the Sahel 
Region of West Africa and expel foreign troops from that region. To achieve its goals, 
MUJAO has teamed up with Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation 
of Azawad (MNLA) in driving the Malian Armed Forces out of Northern Mali, after 
which it occupied territories in Northern Mali around Goa. In this community, MUJAO 
projected that it was defending the local population in Gao and appealed to religious leaders 
and local “notables,” mainly Arab and Songhai, for support. In August 2013, MUJAO 
merged with al Multathamum Battalion to form Al Mourabitoun.51 Al Mourabitoun had 
attacked states and facilities in the Sahel, including Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako (Mali) 
on November 2015 and Cappuccino Café and Hotel in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) on 
January 2016. Like other terrorist groups, MUJAO’s or Al Mourabitoun’s attacks are 
waged in both Mali and states in the Sahel because MUJAO or Al Mourabitoun members 
dwell in this environment and are familiar with the terrain, which they easily navigate.  
7. Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) 
Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which means “Group for the support 
of Islam and Muslims,”52 is another Islamist extremist group that has orchestrated several 
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terrorist attacks in Mali. According to Africa Dense Forum, “the group is most active in 
Mali, waging attacks from Bamako to as far north as Taoudenni.”53 However, Burkina 
Faso and Niger have also been attacked by JNIM.54 JNIM is an al Qaeda affiliate formed 
in the Sahel Region of West Africa by a merger of three jihadist organizations—Ansar 
Dine, Al Murabitoon, and AQIM—under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghaly, founder and 
former militant of Ansar Dine and longtime leader of Mali’s Tuareg uprising. JNIM 
comprises about 1,000 to 2,000 members, and its main goal is to expel non-Muslim 
occupiers from the Sahel Region of West Africa and institute sharia law in the whole of 
that region.55 JNIM is opposed to western presence, specifically French and U.S. personnel 
in Mali. Consequently, its leader Ghaly affirms that JNIM’s secondary targets were the 
U.S. and France’s allies in West Africa, whereas France was their primary enemy for being 
an old enemy of Muslims in that part of the Muslim world.56 Ghaly concludes that France’s 
allies in West Africa, including the United States, were JNIM’s second adversary.57 
According to Weiss, JNIM has claimed many attacks in Mali, which “includes two major 
assaults on Malian military bases which left dozens of soldiers dead.”58  
B. MALI’S VULNERABILITIES 
The terrorist threats to Mali cannot be disconnected from the country’s 
vulnerabilities, mainly its state of deprivation, attacks on neighboring countries, and harsh, 
vast, porous, and mostly unmanned terrain that conceals terrorists from security operatives. 
This section surveys these issues in their turn. 
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Mali’s ungoverned spaces conceal terrorists and criminals that access them, thereby 
promoting terrorism and organized crime. According to Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, the 
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Navy, ungoverned spaces are 
“geographic areas where governments do not exercise effective control….Terrorist groups 
and narco-traffickers use these areas as sanctuaries to train, plan and organize, [operations] 
relatively free from interference.”59 Terrorists exploit the porosity of ungoverned spaces 
to illicitly access states and inflict atrocities on their targets. Mali’s porous borders are vast, 
and securing them demands collaborative efforts from Sahelian states, which the regional 
bodies can lead. 
1. Mali’s State of Deprivation 
According to the International Organization for Migration, which quotes a World 
Bank report of 2013, “Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world, with 43.6 percent 
of its population in 2009/2010 below the poverty line.”60 Consequently, in Mali, militants 
exploit the vulnerability of the masses, preying on their economic straits to recruit their 
children as terrorists. According to Obajr, “hundreds if not thousands of Malian children 
have been sold to armed groups by family members or school officials in exchange for 
money.”61 In reality, hundreds or thousands of children have been sold; in other instances, 
children have also been enticed to become terrorists by money and the appeal of fighting 
for God.62  
A further complication is economic disparity, which could stem from a variety of 
factors including the Malian government’s granting of significant privileges to those 
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aligned with the center and failing to curb corruption.63 On economic disparity, Hoije notes 
that “high unemployment—especially among young people—has spawned widespread 
discontent with authorities in the southern capital.”64 Mali’s northern region suffers 
particularly from this marginalization from state authorities and severe geographical 
challenges.  
2. Regional and Domestic Instability 
Mali shares common borders with Algeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, the Ivory 
Coast, Senegal, and Mauritania, which means it also shares its neighbors’ insecurity, 
particularly their terrorist threats.65 The Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2019, which 
analyzes the impact of terrorism in 163 countries, ranks Mali as 13th. The same index ranks 
its neighbors—Niger as 23rd, Burkina Faso as 38th, Algeria as 57th, and the Ivory Coast 
as 72nd—for frequency of terrorist attacks in 2018.66 The frequency of terrorist attacks on 
Mali’s neighbors and their level of insecurity illustrate that Mali is at the heart of terrorism. 
The attacks on Mali’s neighbors also depict that Mali will continue to suffer from threats 
of terrorism if the level of terrorist threats to its neighbors continues to be high. 
Consequently, no single state in the Sahel will be able to address the attacks all alone given 
the regional dimension of the threats, and this necessitates regional intervention to liberate 
the Sahel from terrorism.  
Furthermore, Mali is home to more than 24 distinct ethnic groups, with the main 
ethnic groups being the Mande, Bambara, Malinke, and Sarakole.67 In some cases, these 
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subpopulations may feel a divided loyalty between the state of Mali and their own ethnic 
groups. Mali’s ethnic divide was manifested during its 2012 military leadership, as Malian 
armed forces relegated the Arabs and Tuaregs and systematically abused them. Research 
that the Human Rights Watch undertook in Mali in 2012 found that “outside the capital, 
the Malian army has arbitrarily detained and executed mostly Tuareg and Arab men for 
their alleged connections to rebel groups in the north.”68 Apart from the Arabs and 
Tuaregs, the Fulanis have also experienced their share of brutality. According to the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), villages where Fulanis reside, e.g., Koulogon, were 
attacked in January, resulting in the death of 37 people.69 Although the attackers have not 
stated the reasons for the attacks and remain incognito, the attack cannot be unconnected 
from ethnic problems, given that Fulanis have been accused of supporting the jihadists.70 
Mali encourages religious tolerance amid a predominantly Muslim population.71 
Indeed, according to the U.S. Department of States, “statistics of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Worship, [show that] Muslims constitute an estimated 95 percent of the 
population.”72 Even among the Muslim majority in Mali, Islamist extremists use Islamic 
religious tenets to sow the seeds of discord and recruit. At the same time, Islamist 
extremists perpetuate horrific acts to instill fear in the population, attract media attention, 
and coerce governments to adhere to their demands.  
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3. Ungoverned Spaces 
The Malian Sahara allows Islamist terrorists and secular-national insurgents to 
operate because it is chronically under policed and porous.73 The UN shares these concerns 
and has commented that the Sahelian borders are porous, harsh, and extremely hard to 
control and can be easily accessed by terrorists.74 Indeed, the porosity of the Sahelian 
borders envelops terrorists and transcends borders of Sahelian states; thus, it can be 
addressed through regular border patrols, intelligence sharing, and joint border 
management and control meetings of Sahelian states, which the regional organizations 
should lead for proper coordination and control while also training security operatives for 
maximal efficiency. That said, Mali’s corrupt state officials exploit the porosity of the 
border to participate in trafficking of contraband items, mainly cigarettes, narcotics, and 
arms, which Islamist extremists use in attacks against the state.75 Organized criminal 
syndicates also take advantage of the ungoverned spaces of Mali to conduct their illicit 
trades. According to ICG, “many of the armed groups in Northern Mali rely on the drug 
trade to finance operations, meet logistical needs, and acquire weapons and vehicles.”76  
Organized crime in the Sahel Region of West Africa is even more severe in the 
form of human trafficking. According to BBC News, “hundreds of African men dreaming 
of a future in Europe pass through one of Gao’s three ‘ghettos’ every month.”77 The use 
of the Sahel’s ungoverned spaces to traffic people to Europe impacts security of states in 
the region, especially when migrants are unable to continue their journey and stay in the 
Sahel only to become radicalized as terrorists, or when terrorists use migration as cover for 
reconnaissance and attacks.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated the capacity of terrorists to defeat the Malian armed 
forces and institute their system of governance. The chapter showed that in the absence of 
regional forces, terrorism will thrive in Mali and the Sahel. Hence, regional intervention is 
imperative, which the main research question of this thesis—what can regional 
organizations do differently to combat the threats of terrorism in the Sahel more 
effectively?—seeks to answer.  
Mali’s terrorist threats transcend the borders of Mali while factors that exacerbate 
Mali’s terrorist threats demand regional attention to better secure Mali and its neighbors. 
The terrorist groups in Mali are affiliated to al Qaeda and ISIS and exploit the protection 
received from ungoverned spaces as a shield to attack Mali and its neighbours. Given the 
proliferation of terrorist organizations and their increasing level of threats to the security 
of Mali and the Sahel Region of West Africa, it is apparent that regional support is 
imperative to rid Mali and the Sahel of terrorist attacks. Additionally, Malians remain 
worried, mindful of the rate of fatalities and injuries sustained in terrorist assaults.  
Furthermore, Malians are still licking their wounds and grappling with the pains of 
shariah in the brief period it was imposed in Northern Mali when terrorists controlled that 
region. Moreover, the oxygen of terrorism in Mali—marginalization, ungoverned spaces, 
organized crime, and environmental degradation, among others—remains prevalent, as 
terrorists mutate in names, outlook, and mode of operation, making the mitigation of 
terrorism an uphill task.  
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III. MALI’S LOCAL RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREATS  
Mali’s local response indicates gains and challenges of Mali’s efforts to curb 
terrorism within its territory. Mali’s local response commences with legal and strategic 
policy framework, which provides the legal basis for Mali’s counterterrorism policies and 
strategies and draws its strength from international protocols and conventions that 
harmonize counterterrorism measures in the fight against terrorism. Although a GTI reports 
that the impact of Mali’s terrorism has fluctuated in the past five years from 5.87, 6.03, 
5.88, and 6.02 to 6.65 in 2015 to 2019, respectively, the figures (6.02-6.65) portray that 
there was a severe increase in Mali’s terrorism in 2018 and 2019, respectively.78 Mali’s 
situation is similar to that of states in the Sahel, for example Burkina Faso, which 
experienced an increase in terrorism index from 4.81 in 2017 to 5.42 in 2018.79 The reason 
for the increase in terrorism in both Mali and Burkina Faso cannot be unconnected from 
the proliferation of terrorism, considering the harshness of the Sahel, inadequate logistics 
of state security operatives, and their inability to adequately combat the threat. Thus, any 
attempt to combat terrorism in one state will be futile without regional considerations.  
Mali has ratified and implemented international protocols and conventions and has 
made some gains in implementation, but these are not commensurate with the challenges, 
as Mali is ranked 13th on impact of terrorism in the Global Terrorism Index 2019.80 This 
ranking, which cannot be uncoupled from challenges experienced in the implementation of 
Mali’s policies and counterterrorism strategy, happens to be Mali’s worst in five years.81  
This chapter discusses Mali’s approach in three sections: Section A details Mali’s 
legal and policy framework, Section B examines Mali’s domestic practices, and Section C 
provides Mali’s strategic operational response to terrorism. 
 
78 World Data Atlas, “Mali- Global Terrorism Index,” Knoema, Accessed August 10, 2020, 
https://knoema.com/atlas/Mali/topics/World-Rankings/World-Rankings/Global-terrorism-index.  
79  Trading Economics, Burkina Faso Terrorism Index 2002æ2018 Data, Accessed September 5, 
2020, https://Tradingeconomics.Com/Burkina-Faso/Terrorism-Index.  
80 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2019-Measuring the Impact of 
Terrorism. 
81 World Data Atlas, “Mali-Global Terrorism Index.” 
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A. LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK  
In response to the proliferation of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa and 
Mali specifically, the government of Mali has acceded to international protocols and 
conventions on terrorism and codified them as domestic law.82 This section assesses the 
impact of the protocols and conventions Mali has ratified and incorporated to combat 
terrorism. 
1. Ratification of Protocols and Conventions 
The Republic of Mali has acceded to universal protocols or conventions against 
terrorism in its territory. Mali has acceded to the Convention on Prevention and Punishment 
of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973); 
therefore, Mali is expected to secure these diplomatic agents when they visit or are in Mali 
for official functions [Article 1 (a) and (b)].83 Consequently, the Malian armed forces have 
launched several attacks against terrorists. In one onslaught to secure Westerners in hotels 
and restaurants in Bamako, Malian security forces successfully arrested several terrorist 
suspects and seized weapons and explosives.84  
With the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation (1971), Mali is to secure aircrafts in its land and airspace against all forms 
of violence. Securing aircrafts and their content against terrorism is required, given the 
volume of people that travel daily by air and the spate of casualties that terrorists inflict 
because aviation security systems are riddled by pitfalls. Therefore, to enhance airport 
security, Mali has installed a passenger screening system at its airport to enhance air transit 
 
82 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Review of the Legal Regime Against Terrorism in 
West and Central Africa, Working Document (New York; United Nations, October 2008), 121. f. 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/terrorism/Publications/Review_West_African_CT_Legal_Regime/
A_Review_of_the_Legal_Regime_Ag_Terr_in_W_and_C_Africa_V09837531.pd. 
83 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), Annexed to General Assembly resolution 3166 
(XVIII) (New York: United Nations, 2005), 2, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
conventions/9_4_1973.pdf. 
84 U.S. State Department, Country Report on Terrorism: Mali (Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, 2019), https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/mali/.  
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security monitoring.85 Despite installing a passenger screening system and adopting many 
other conventions, Mali’s aviation security remains challenged because of the wave of 
terrorist attacks in Mali.  
Mali has incorporated international conventions and protocols acceded to in a 
counterterrorism law. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “in 
July 23, 2008, Mali adopted a counter-terrorism law (Law No. 08–025) to address such 
issues of terrorism as offences related to civil aviation, vessels and fixed-platforms, 
dangerous materials, diplomatic agents, hostage-taking, financing of terrorism and nuclear 
terrorism.”86 Although Mali has adopted this law, aviation reports indicate that Mali’s 
aviation system is unsafe and prone to attacks. A Safe Airspace aviation report published 
on June 19, 2020, placed Mali’s aviation system at level two risk, with the likelihood for 
danger.87 According to the report, Mali remains the deadliest place to serve in the UN. The 
United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom have all issued warnings advising all 
aircrafts to fly higher in Mali. For example, United States has advised that caution be taken 
when flying into, out of, within, or over the territory and airspace of Mali at altitudes below 
FL 260 due to ongoing fighting and extremist activities, while the Federal Republic of 
Germany has advised civil and German air operators to avoid landing, taxing, parking, and 
taking off at the airports in Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti, and Kidal (Mali) due to potential risk 
to aviation from dedicated anti-aviation weaponry and possible terrorist attacks.88 The 
battery of concerns regarding the insecurity of Mali’s air domain indicates that Mali is 
unsafe and portrays deficiencies in the implementation of its counterterrorism law.  
 
85 U.S. Department of State, Mali 2019 Crime and Safety Report (Washington, DC: Overseas Security 
Advisory Council, July 31, 2019), https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/4c12f7e7-9a2f-4269-8e3f-
16649ed848ed.  
86 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, A Review of the Legal Regime Against Terrorism in 
West and Central Africa, 121.  
87 Safe Airspace, “Conflict Zone and Risk Database, All Current Warnings in One Place,” Accessed 
August 15, 2020, https://safeairspace.net/mali/. 
88 Safe Airspace, “Conflict Zone and Risk Database.” 
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B. DOMESTIC STRATEGIES 
Mali has instituted diverse domestic strategies to secure its state and people against 
terrorist attacks. Mali has designed and implemented a National Counterterrorism Strategy 
that reflects its counterterrorism laws. Also, it has instituted anti-money laundering (AML) 
procedures to monitor financial transactions and apprehend offenders and has established 
procedures for transitional justice and religious tolerance. Mali’s AML measures are the 
right steps and can yield dividend if rigidly followed. An evaluation of Mali’s AML 
procedures undertaken by the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money 
Laundering (GIABA) reported that the preliminary measures instituted are good, although 
Mali remains vulnerable to money laundering.89    
Thus, this section of the chapter assesses the impact of Mali’s domestic strategies 
in the fight against terrorism.  
1. National Counterterrorism Strategy 
The Republic of Mali has integrated its counterterrorism laws into a single 
operational strategy to combat terrorism within its jurisdiction, thereby adopting a national 
strategy to counter violent extremism. Unlike the policies initially mentioned, this strategy 
is a national effort to operationalize the policies acceded to and incorporates previous 
efforts to combat terrorism. Mali’s counterterrorism strategy demands logistics and 
collaboration among security sector operatives and their local partners and is based on five 
pillars, namely prevention, protection, pursuit, response, and social cohesion.90 On 
prevention, Mali is expected to combat terrorism by identifying methods, propaganda, and 
instruments terrorists use to inflict harm on the people. On protection, Mali shall protect 
its citizens and Critical National Infrastructure, thereby reducing their level of 
vulnerability. That said, the impact of terrorism in Mali since 2018 as portrayed in Mali- 
GTI indicates that the national strategy has not been prudently rolled out, although the 
 
89 GIABA, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures: Mali Mutual 
Evaluation Report (Dakar, Senegal: GIABA, November 2019, ii, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Mutual-Evaluation-Mali-2019.pdf. 
90 U.S. Department of State, Mali 2018 International Religious Freedom Report, 3.  
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possibility exists that progress will be made if the necessary training and support are 
provided.91  
2. Anti-money Laundering Procedures 
Mali has instituted AML and counter-financing of terrorism (CFT) measures in 
adherence to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s demands that member states 
are “to implement measures against money-laundering and the financing of terrorism.”92 
On counter money laundering measures of Mali, GIABA reports that “Financial 
Institutions, including banks and large DFIs, have a good understanding of their AML/CFT 
obligations. They have put in place due diligence measures tailored to their risks and taken 
specific due diligence measures for high-risk situations.”93 However, GIABA’s report 
concludes that Mali faces risk from homegrown, locally funded terrorists and terrorist 
groups that receive support from external actors.94 From the GIABA reports, it appears 
that the likelihood for Mali to experience money laundering is high, regardless of 
preliminary measures instituted to curb the threat. That said, GIABA is “an institution of 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responsible for facilitating 
the adoption and implementation of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) [policies] and 
Counter-Financing of Terrorism (CFT) [strategies] in West Africa.”95 Additionally, Mali 
has established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), which collects and analyzes bank 
reports on financial customer transactions to detect suspicious transactions and mitigate 
terrorist financing.96 To enhance the FIU’s activities, Mali has established specialized 
courts that conduct investigations and try money laundering matters. Although 
establishment of financial policies to mitigate money laundering is a step to combat the 
menace, money laundering mitigation in Mali remains a challenge because Mali cannot 
 
91 World Data Atlas, “Mali- Global Terrorism Index.” 
92 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC on Money-laundering and Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism. 
93 GIABA, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures, i. 
94 GIABA, Anti-money Laundering and Counter-terrorist Financing Measures, ii.  
95 GIABA, “Mission and Vision,” Accessed August 15, 2020, https://www.giaba.org/. 
96 GIABA, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures, ii.  
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effectively secure its vast porous borders, which promote trafficking of contraband 
commodities and thereby illicitly generate resources for terrorism. According to GIABA, 
“Mali’s criminal control policy and AML/CFT strategy do not explicitly identify 
confiscations as a priority, and only a few criminal investigation officers and investigating 
magistrates have received training on financial investigation.”97 
3. Transitional Justice  
Part of Mali’s strategy to mitigate its wave of terrorism is the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to listen to testimonies of victims and 
perpetrators, document findings from the commission, and proffer recommendations to 
help bridge the gaps in Mali’s diverse society. Following its establishment in 2014, the 
TRC was placed under a ministry (the Ministry of Reconciliation) to afford it a cabinet-
level profile. Unfortunately, this evolution makes its independence questionable while Mali 
continues to experience unstable security challenges and threats of terrorism that have 
derailed the TRC’s public hearings.98 Also, the TRC has drafted rules, established internal 
structures, and adopted a general strategy for its operations, but the credibility of the 
commission is threatened as victims have given falsified statements to attract reparations.99  
Mali’s TRC public hearings are meant to restore victims’ dignity, facilitate their 
healing, and keep the world abreast of the horror victims have painfully endured. 
According to the President of the TRC, Ousmane Oumarou Sidibe, victims’ stories will be 
factored into Mali’s national history for use as an educational tool to prevent a recurrence 
of violence.100 Given the significance of the TRC in the consolidation of peace in, for 
example, South Africa and Sierra Leone, it can be argued that the establishment of Mali’s 
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TRC was positive in unifying the country and mitigating its wave of terrorism. However, 
for the hatchet to be properly buried, the various parties—mainly, government, 
perpetrators, and victims—must be sincere and there must be reparations to appease 
victims.  
4. Religious Tolerance 
In one local counterterrorism innovation, Mali incorporated its religious bodies in 
its executive arm of government through the establishment of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Worship.101 The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Worship has promoted 
tolerance and enhanced collaboration between Muslim and Christian religious leaders in 
their condemnation of extremism and demand for peace and cohesion. For example, the 
United States Department of State notes that “Muslim, Protestant, and Roman Catholic 
religious leaders [have] jointly called for peace and solidarity among all faiths at 
celebrations marking Christmas, the New Year, and Eid al-Fitr.”102 The Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, with support from the Islamic High Council and the Malian Association 
of Imams, makes use of TV, YouTube, and Facebook in its counterterrorism campaign 
called, “Mali Kuma Kan,” or “Mali’s Voice” that uses local Malian languages to project 
gruesome images of extremism.103 However, following the August 2020 military coup that 
toppled Mali’s democratically elected leadership and seated retired Col. Maj. Bah N’Daw 
as Mali’s interim president, a new cabinet has been established with board members of the 
parties that signed the 2015 peace agreement as Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Youth and Sports, and the National Reconciliation.104 However, it is yet to be ascertained 
whether the new cabinet will restore peace and mitigate terrorism in Mali. Furthermore, 
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although the Ministry of Religious Affairs has yet to be reinstated, the significance of 
religion in Mali remains constant.  
Religion plays a vital role in Mali and is significant in Mali’s counterterrorism 
drive, given Mali’s reverence of religious leaders and Malian’s zest for worship. 
Unfortunately, terrorists that operate in Mali are jihadists who use religion as a front to 
attack and destabilize the country. According to Lebovich, “Mali’s religious leaders draw 
crowds so large that they are the envy of its politicians and celebrities.”105 Moreover, 
Mali’s religions provide the forum for collaboration of religious leaders on matters of 
morality and conduct. Ironically, a renowned Islamic figure, Imam Mahmoud Dicko, 
caused the unrest that led to a revolt against Mali’s President Boubacar Keita that resulted 
in the military coup that toppled him from leadership in August 2020.106 Dicko’s local 
support illustrates the extent to which Malians respect religious heads and the range of their 
influence. Still, the deposition of Mali’s president and incorporation of the coupists—Col. 
Sadio Camara, Col. Modibo Kone, and Col.-Maj. Ismael Wague—into Mali’s executive 
are negative precedents that pose uncertainty to Mali’s national security.107 Additionally, 
deposing of democratically elected regimes can be replicated in Sahelian states if not 
checked. Military coups or appointment of coupists into executive positions can promote 
insecurity, which terrorists can exploit if measures are not instituted to forestall them. 
Given the undemocratic and repressive nature of coups vis-à-vis the AU’s nonacceptance 
policy on coups, it is imperative that the AU revisit its policy to mitigate coups in its 
constituents.108  
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C. OPERATIONAL RESPONSE 
Mali has operationalized its counterterrorism policies and strategies with the use of 
its national security institutions and obtained some successes in the process but remains 
ineffective in securing Mali because the threat is concealed by its border while security 
operatives are ill equipped, undisciplined, or unprofessional. According to a U.S. 
Department of State report on terrorism in Mali available from Refworld, “the Malian 
Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense (MOD) remained the primary entities 
responsible for securing Mali against terrorist threats.”109 Mali uses its armed forces to 
secure its borders and uses the police, in partnership with the gendarmerie and national 
guard force, to secure the interior of Mali against terrorism. Hence, this section examines 
the contribution of Mali’s national security institutions—the armed forces, police, 
gendarmerie, and national guard force—in the fight against terrorism.  
1. Response from Mali’s Armed Forces 
Mali’s armed forces consist of the National Defense, which, according to 
International Sector Advisory Team, comprise the Air Force, the Army, and the National 
Guard, alongside the National Gendarmerie.110 The Malian armed forces are to secure Mali 
against terrorism and support law and order operatives during peacetime as an auxiliary 
force to maintain public order.111 The Malian armed forces have conducted several 
operations to combat terrorism, some independently and some in collaboration with foreign 
troops in an integrated manner. For example, the Malian armed forces have served in the 
Joint Force Group of Five for the Sahel (FC G5 S), which comprised soldiers drawn from 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali.112 In an independent operation launched 
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against Islamist extremists, the Malian armed forces found identity cards of several foreign 
nationals revealing that some of Mali’s terrorists are non-Malian nationals.113 Similarly, it 
has conducted counterterrorism operations in the Mopti and Segou regions, resulting in the 
arrest of at least 13 terrorists.114 Additionally, the Malian armed forces has teamed up with 
the armed forces in Burkina Faso to carry out cross-border counterterrorism operations and 
collaborated with French forces to launch a month-long counterterrorism operation in 
Timbuktu, northern Mali.115 However, Malian armed forces have suffered defeat in the 
north and several massacres, including the loss of over fifty men in November 2020.116 
Commenting on the massacre, the Guardian quotes local media that “after an initial 
bombardment, the positions of the Malian soldiers were over-run by small groups of 
militants, some riding motorbikes. Only 20 soldiers survived the assault.”117 Moreover, 
the Malian armed forces have exhibited unprofessional tendencies. For example, they have 
staged mutinies and disputes over leadership, pay, and promotions and have toppled their 
democratically elected regimes twice in a decade (in 2012 and 2020).118 However, the 
independent operation in which the Malian armed forces found identity cards and the joint 
operations that led to the arrest of 13 terrorists are successes of the Malian armed forces, 
which indicate that if the Malian armed forces are properly restructured and trained, they 
will be very effective. These necessitate reform of the Malian armed forces through a 
security sector reform (SSR) process to eliminate the deadwood and the lawless and 
facilitate the committed and disciplined.  
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The military coup of Amadou Sanogo in 2012 resulted in the disappearance of his 
military adversaries, some of whose corpses were later discovered in mass graves.119 
Military coup is a mark of unprofessionalism, while surreptitious executions of those 
opposed to the junta leadership portray the level of inhumanity and human rights abuses 
Malian armed forces perpetuate. That said, prior to the 2012 military coup, military officers 
were trained from a U.S.-backed $5 million project provided to capacitate the Malian 
armed forces.120 The U.S. support for training of personnel of Mali’s military was aimed 
at improving their operational and professional capacity. However, the training has not 
transformed or improved their capacity to effectively combat Mali’s terrorist threats. 
Therefore, the Malian armed forces, though under the control of the executive, partner with 
local operatives, mainly, police, gendarmerie, and national guard, in the fight against 
terrorism, as indicated in Table 1. Table 1 reveals the local security forces that secure Mali 
and portrays the supervisory role of Mali’s executive over them. 
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Table 1. Partners of the Malian Armed Forces in the Fight Against 
Terrorism.121 
No. Institution Role 
1. The Executive Supervises the Malian armed forces 
Determines Malian armed forces’ budget, guidelines, 
and priorities 
2. Malian Armed Forces Secure Mali against threats of terrorism 
Complement efforts of the police in law and order 
3. The Police Protect lives and properties 
Gather intelligence and support investigations  
4.  The Gendarmerie  Shares some internal security roles with the police 
Collects intelligence and protects private property 
5. The National Guard Protects Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) 
Collaborates in maintaining public order and territorial 
defense 
6. Mali’s Religious  
Leaders 
Promote religious tolerance 
Are responsible for preventing Islamist radicalization  
 
2. Response from Mali’s Internal Security Agencies 
Mali’s internal security operatives—police, gendarmerie, and national guard 
force—collaborate in Mali’s counterterrorism drive. The gendarmerie (a paramilitary 
force) shares internal security duties with the police but focuses on rural areas, whereas the 
police that maintain law and order focus on urban towns.122 Given the level of terrorism 
in Northern Mali, state authorities have deployed 2,026 gendarmerie and police officers in 
that region to secure it against terrorism.123 Mali’s gendarmerie teams up with the national 
guard force to form Mali’s Special Anti-terrorist Task Force that conducts counterterrorism 
patrols across the length and breadth of Mali.124 The establishment of an interagency 
approach to combat terrorism in Mali seems ideal given diverse competencies of 
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institutions in that integrated body. Unfortunately, the interagency approach has not 
obtained its objectives because it is hampered by resource constraints, corruption, 
inadequate training, and logistical challenges that retard performance and undermine 
operations.125 On the performance of Malian security operatives, the U.S. Department of 
State affirms, “law enforcement units lacked capacity, training, and the necessary equipment 
to secure Mali’s porous borders, which extend about 4,500 miles and touch seven 
countries.”126 Given the tactical role of Malian security operatives coupled with the AU’s 
subsequent withdrawal from Mali, it is imperative that Malian security operatives be 
incorporated in the SSR process to sharpen their skills.  
3. Intelligence Gathering and Processing 
The porosity of Mali’s borders, coupled with the acumen of terrorists to break 
security defenses with innovative and novel strategies, the Malian security authorities must 
embark on intelligence gathering and processing to identify potential and real threats in 
order to mitigate surprise terrorist attacks. However, Mali does not have an effective 
intelligence service, in no small part because Mali does not rigidly follow the intelligence 
cycle comprising planning, collection, analysis and processing, production, and 
dissemination, as illustrated in Figure 1: 127  
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Figure 1. Security Operations Intelligence Cycle.128 
The protest against the Code de la Famille had negative consequences because 
Mali’s intelligence services are ineffective.129 According to Matei, the State Security 
General Intelligence Directorate (DGSE) and the General Intelligence Directorate of the 
National Police are Mali’s two known intelligence agencies.130 However, Matei notes that 
the DGSE is deficient in operational and analytical abilities, which shows that the Malian 
intelligence agencies do not follow the cycle effectively.131  
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Mali gathers human intelligence, and its intelligence functions are under the army’s 
chief of staff as the G2 directorate.132 Like other intelligence agencies, Mali shares 
intelligence but is constrained in doing so. For example, intelligence officers gather 
intelligence manually.133 Impeding Mali’s intelligence is scarcity of major sources of 
information. For example, in Northern Mali, local media is scarce and scattered while 
major sources of information are gossip and casual conversation, which cannot be accepted 
at face value as authentic.134 On effectiveness of Mali’s intelligence agencies, Maiga notes 
that “although Mali has a solid framework of statutory regulations for intelligence 
institutions, roles, and missions, in addition to a budget for intelligence, it seems that in 
Mali, the intelligence community is struggling to deal effectively with the threats that the 
country faces after more than two decades of democratic experience.”135  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated that there are gaps in Mali’s local or domestic response; 
hence, Mali could not combat terrorism within its territory. There are gaps in Mali’s 
policies and strategies that impeded Mali’s responses against terrorism. For example, 
Mali’s AML procedures combat money laundering superficially, and only a few of Mali’s 
personnel have been trained on financial investigations. Furthermore, Mali’s 
counterterrorism strategies have not addressed the root cause of Mali’s crisis while its 
security personnel remain weak and unproductive.  
Effective counterterrorism measures demand intangibles like “ethics” and 
“motivation” and anti-terrorism actions. These counterterrorism requirements are either 
inadequate or not manifested, and in instances where anti-terrorism actions have been 
rolled out, some have been characterized by gross human rights violations that promote 
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resentment of locals against security personnel, thereby increasing the polarization of Mali 
and enhancing its level of terrorist threats.  
Ultimately, Mali’s local response to combatting terrorism, although manifested in 
a legislative, policy, and operational framework, has not altered the surge of terrorism Mali 
experiences, which necessitates the regional bodies’ intervention as Mali cannot effectively 
combat its terrorist threats alone.  
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IV. REGIONAL RESPONSES TO MALI’S THREATS OF 
TERRORISM 
Unlike the limited impact of Mali’s national responses, regional interventions have 
made a sizable dent on terrorism. This chapter explores specifically the activities of the 
regional and sub-regional organizations—the AU and ECOWAS—in the fight against 
Mali’s terrorist threats and finds that several measures at the regional level can help 
mitigate Mali’s terrorism. That said, though effective, regional bodies need more time for 
planning, studying the outbreak, and curbing terrorism. Regional organizations have 
liberated northern Mali from terrorist occupation and governance; mediated and 
diplomatically pacified the conflicting parties in the series of insurgencies experienced; 
promoted state governance throughout Mali, resulting in conductance of peaceful 
elections; and launched successful operations that cut off supply routes of extremists, from 
which large caches of arms and ammunition were obtained. To this end, this chapter first 
analyzes the counterterrorism policies and diplomatic engagements that the AU has rolled 
out with ECOWAS, which, in turn, reflect the aims and aspirations of its global partner, 
the UN. 
Next, this chapter turns to regional defense and security activities of the AU and 
ECOWAS, including the FC G5 S and the African-led International Support Mission to 
Mali (AFISMA). Finally, this chapter explores other regional options that may be available 
to Mali, particularly with the broader support of the Sahel’s partners. 
A. POLICIES AND DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENTS   
Regional policies have been successful in bringing perpetrators to justice for 
terrorist activities and in reconciling government and insurgents. For example, a Malian 
terrorist, Al Faqi Al Mahadi, has been incarcerated in the Hague for nine years for his role 
in the destruction of ancient shrines in Timbuktu while another, Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz 
Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, is in detention awaiting trial at the Hague for enforcing 
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policies on sexual violence and destruction of cultural monuments.136 Additionally, 
regional negotiations on Mali’s crisis have resulted in the signing of accords—the 
Tamanrasset Accord in 1991, the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement of June 18, 2013, 
and the Bamako (Algiers) agreement of 2015—that have helped unify conflicting parties 
in Mali’s civil crisis, although some of the obligations of the accords have not been 
fulfilled.  
Hence, this section examines policies that the AU promulgated and the diplomatic 
meetings that the AU and ECOWAS convened to reconcile and unify the Malian 
government and its local insurgents. Moreover, the section explores disruptive forces in 
and to the peace mediation processes.   
1. Regional and Sub-regional Legal Framework 
The AU has enacted the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, 1999, which, according to the African Union Peace and Security, “defines areas 
of cooperation among states, establishes state jurisdiction over terrorist acts, and provides 
a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal 
assistance.”137 This convention mostly tasks states with activities to execute in the 
mitigation of terrorism. For example, Article 4, 2 (a) of the OAU Convention on the 
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism stipulates that state parties shall “prevent their 
territories from being used as a base for the planning, organization, or execution of terrorist 
acts.”138 However, Islamist extremists’ brief occupation of northern Mali and their 
introduction of shariah law in that country in 2012 illustrate Mali’s inability to fully 
implement the convention, thereby necessitating regional response. According to African 
Globe, Mali’s terrorists “recruited locally in Mali and the broader Sahel, both from Mali’s 
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arid north as well as from the more heavily-populated south.”139 According to the United 
Nations Children’s Fund, Arab terrorist groups were recruiting children in the hundreds in 
Northern Mali as terrorists.140 The occupation of Northern Mali and the recruitment of 
Malians it resulted in preceded the intervention of regional forces that drove terrorists from 
Northern Mali.  
Another counterterrorism policy, the AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, addresses issues of border security, legislative and legal 
procedures, and financing of terrorism, among others.141 It has as its product the African 
Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, which analyzes terrorism incidences in 
Africa through monthly bulletins that inform states on trends of terrorism for remedial 
action.142 For example, in its July 2020 bulletin, Mali was portrayed as the African state 
most affected by terrorism in July 2020, with 29 attacks and 86 deaths.143   
2. Inter-organizations and State Partnership  
The AU and ECOWAS partner with the UN, the EU, United States, and France, 
among others, to secure Mali. Their collaboration has resulted in support to the regional 
partners, with regard to finance, logistics, and training. The AU and ECOWAS partner with 
the UN, which has primacy on matters of global security, and work with the EU, United 
States, and France to promote stability and prevent Mali from being used as a base to breed 
and export terrorism to the west and the world generally. For example, the AU has a joint 
EU-AU strategic partnership adopted in 2007 that, according to the Council of European 
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Union, “acts as the formal channel for EU relations with African countries.”144 Through 
this partnership, the AU has derived support from the EU for its peace and security 
initiatives, specifically data collection on early warning signs, making of informed security 
decisions, support toward a standby force, and engagements with the youth and civil 
society on matters of security.145 On establishment of a standby force, while the AU has 
an ad hoc regional integrated force, it does not permanently maintain a standby force, even 
though the African leaders have endorsed its establishment. According to Batware, the 
protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council and the associated African Standby 
Force entered into force in December 2003, only “17 months after being signed.”146 
Additionally, although the final concept adopted provided for the establishment of five 
standby brigade-level forces—North Africa Regional Standby Brigade; East Africa 
Standby Brigade; Force Multinational “de Afrique” Central; Southern Africa Standby 
Brigade; and ECOWAS Standby Brigade147—not a single one has been established, even 
though it is very necessary considering the AU’s role in peacekeeping and peace building. 
Moreover, the establishment of the standby force will provide African peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement operations trained manpower to deal with issues that pose threat to the 
region. Therefore, it is time to test the process, with the establishment of at least a single 
standby force.  
3. Diplomacy and Negotiations  
The AU and ECOWAS have also employed diplomacy to combat Mali’s crisis and 
presided at diplomatic negotiations between aggrieved parties—government of Mali and 
insurgents—to limit their political animosity. With exception to the Tamanrasset Accord, 
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the AU and ECOWAS have obtained much success in diplomatic engagements on the 
implementation of terms of the peace accords.  
The Tamanrasset Accord did not stop hostility because its terms of agreement were 
not publicized, and the government that signed the accord was deposed before the 
implementation of the accord. The Algerian government led the diplomatic engagements 
that resulted in the Tamanrasset Accord.148 However, the Tamanrasset Accord was 
unsuccessful because it did not prevent unrest or intermittent armed clashes in 
Mali.149Algeria’s diplomatic role is significant in the fight against Mali’s terrorism 
because AQIM originated from Algeria.150 Hence, the Algerian government had the 
government of Mali, the Azaouad Popular Movement, and the Arabic Islamic Front sign 
the Tamanrasset Accord to re-establish and maintain peace and security in Mali.151 The 
Tamanrasset Accord was meant to keep the Malian armed forces to the traditional role of 
defending the territorial integrity of Mali, integrating combatants into the Malian armed 
forces, and promoting cease fire between the opposing factions.152 However, the Malian 
leadership Moussa Traore who signed the accord did not publish it, thereby promoting 
speculation about its content.153 In this regard, Gold attributes Amadou Toumani Toure’s 
military coup in March 1991 to the failure of the Tamanrasset Accord and the wave of 
unrest in Mali.154 According to Barnes, the military strongman Amadou Toumani Toure, 
who toppled Moussa Traore’s leadership, “did not consider Tamanrasset Agreement 
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legitimate and made few moves towards implementing it.”155 Barnes elaborates that many 
“Songhoy were also negative, believing that the Tamanrasset Agreement failed to pay 
serious attention to their particular needs.”156  
Additionally, key stakeholders in Mali, notably civil society, were not represented 
in the Tamanrasset Agreement; thus, the general view was that the parties that signed the 
agreement did not broaden its involvement.157 According to Devermont and Harris, “the 
Accord excludes key actors involved in the Malian conflict … the Accord fails to include 
or at minimum consider options to engage al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the 
prominent jihadist group in Mali in 2015 that was allied with some northern rebel 
faction.”158 Considering the gaps in the Tamanrasset Agreement, it can be argued that for 
peace agreements to be all-encompassing and acceptable, accords must embrace all shades 
of opinion; this necessitates the inclusion of civil society in peace deliberations, given their 
neutrality and expertise on matters of peace and cohesion. 
The Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement of 2013 is another offshoot of the AU 
and ECOWAS diplomatic engagements to combat Mali’s crisis and was successful. The 
president of Burkina Faso (President Blaise Compaore) hosted and led the ECOWAS 
diplomatic efforts, while the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel (former 
President Pierre Buyoya), who also served as special representative and head of the 
AFISMA, represented the AU in that engagement.159 The Malian parties in the 
negotiations were Mali’s Transitional Government of National Unity, the Coordination of 
the MNLA, and the High Council for the Unity of the Azawad.160 According to the AU, 
the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement provided for “among others, the redeployment 
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of the Malian army throughout northern Mali … and the holding of the presidential 
elections scheduled for July 2013 on the entire Malian territory, including Kidal.”161 This 
outcome of the peace agreement was successful because elections were held as scheduled 
and a new leadership elected and installed. On assuming the mantle of leadership, Mali’s 
new leader, President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, lifted warrants of arrest against leaders of 
Mali’s insurgency and released several of their members from prison as conciliatory 
moves.162 Furthermore, the rebels agreed to reciprocate in handing the governor’s office 
and radio station in Kidal to the Malian government.163   
Another peace agreement was the Bamako agreement signed in Mali on May 15, 
2015, following eight months of negotiations between parties to the Malian conflict.164 On 
status of the Bamako agreement, it can be said to be satisfactory for at least providing 
temporal respite. Preceding that agreement, Mali experienced several attacks; these 
gradually ceased when the agreement was signed. The signing of the Bamako agreement 
was followed by publication of its content and backing down of rebels from their initial 
demand of northern (Azawad) autonomy.165 The agreement is meant to restore Mali’s 
peace and foster reconciliation of its locals. However, the ICG elaborates that international 
moderators wrote the agreement to reflect their interest rather than that of the conflicting 
parties.166 Consequently, only two parties, mainly Mali’s government and the Algiers 
Platform, signed the agreement on May 15, 2015. The other party to the crisis, the 
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Coordination of Movement for Azawad, officially did so on June 20, 2015.167 An 
independent observer, the Carter Center that monitors implementation of the agreement, 
notes that parties to the conflict have sustained cessation of hostilities, while the 
government of Mali has launched enhanced disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration measures and demonstrated efforts at promoting inclusive constitutional 
reforms.168  
4. Sabotage of Peace Mediation Processes   
While the regional bodies did much to ensure implementation of peace agreements, 
sabotage from local operatives in some instances derailed the attainment of peace. For 
example, following the Tamanrasset accord, the Malian military became hostile toward 
civilians in Northern Mali, resulting in distrust and the formation of more aggressive 
movements: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Azaouad and the Revolutionary Army 
for the Liberation of Azaouad.169 Also, the rebel group disrupted the Ouagadougou 
agreement in their refusal to disarm because of uncertainty of their status. 
Unprofessionalism among the Malian armed forces, as manifested in its unethical practices, 
can reverse gains made if measures are not put in place to secure Mali preceding the 
departure of regional and international troops. Furthermore, uncertainty with regard to 
status of parties to a conflict can result in breaches of peace agreements if not prudently 
addressed. Hence, the regional bodies should include in the SSR modules on 
professionalism and ethics to promote the armed forces’ adherence to the ethos of 
professionalism and ensure that disarmament is fully done before scaling down operations.  
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B. SECURITY AND DEFENSE   
The AU and ECOWAS ad hoc joint operational security forces, for example the FC 
G5 S and AFISMA, as well as partnering with French forces and their joint operational 
activities have been successful in fighting terrorists, capturing arms, and temporarily 
cutting off some of their supply routes. The establishment of the joint operational forces is 
good because the forces are inclusive of military operatives from the Sahelian countries, 
e.g., Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali,170 that are familiar with the terrain, 
and their presence in the joint operational task force will afford them the expertise required 
to secure their portion of the Malian borders when requested to do so. To be proactive, the 
AU operates a regional intelligence organization, namely, the Committee of Intelligence 
and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), which fosters intelligence sharing between and 
among member states. However, although intelligence activities are classified and 
therefore not published, operations that result in capturing of arms and cutting off supply 
routes can be intelligence led.  
1. Integrated Regional Force 
A regional strategy employed in the mitigation of terrorism in Mali and the Sahel 
Region of West Africa is combat operations, which have decapitated terrorists and chased 
them out of northern Mali. There is the FC G5 S that from November 1 to November 17, 
2019, teamed up with France in operation Bourgou IV that targeted Mali’s Boulikessi 
region and Burkina Faso’s Deou region, in which about 24 terrorists were killed and 64 
vehicles, mobile phones, and ammunition were captured.171 Also, in February 2018, a 
cross-section of the FC G5 S participated in an operation to control land along common 
borders that resulted in the death of 10 AQIM militants and stopped an attempt to smuggle 
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arms.172 Furthermore, a battalion of the Burkina Faso contingent in the FC G5 S has carried 
out an operation in collaboration with the French and UN Multidisciplinary International 
Stabilization Mission to dismantle training camps of terrorists and cut off their supply 
routes.173  
According to Dentice, the regional force “G5 Sahel joint force aims at fighting 
terrorism, organized crime and smuggling through enhanced cooperation among national 
armed forces and surveillance of rural areas.”174 According to Cooke, “the force was 
authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council in April 2017 and was 
strengthened by the adoption of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2359 in 
June.”175 The FC G5 S consists of 5,000 soldiers drawn from some African states.176 
Unlike Mali’s local forces, the integrated composition of the regional force is significant 
because the integrated regional force has different levels of training, experiences, and 
competencies, which-less experienced contingents can learn from, and the integrated 
regional forces also have the required logistics for operations. In this regard, Lawrence E. 
Cline affirms that the Mauritania battalion received from the United States “155 vehicles, 
a Level II field hospital, night vision devices, GPS devices, computers, radio and phone 
communication system, and individual soldier equipment that includes body armor.”177  
The AFISMA was another ad hoc armed African regional initiative to help liberate 
and secure Mali from terrorism. ECOWAS obtained UN’s endorsement to establish 
AFISMA, with Nigeria being the first West African state to send troops to that 
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contingent.178 The establishment of AFISMA was a step toward the implementation of the 
ECOWAS Counterterrorism Strategy and indicated the need for Africans to assume 
responsibility in solving African challenges.179 Maiangwa shares this view and submits 
that, “the responsibility for implementing the ECOWAS Strategy lies, first and foremost, 
with the West African states.”180 Thus, the ECOWAS effort was expected to: 
Support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State 
authority through appropriate capacities; support the Malian authorities in 
their primary responsibility to protect the population; and support the 
Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led 
delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally 
displaced persons and refugees.181 
Nevertheless, AFISMA’s activities in Mali lasted for only a year, with the UN 
rejecting the ECOWAS request for its continuity. According to ECOWAS Peace and 
Security Report (ECOWAS 2013a, 6), “the UN refusal to support ECOWAS and its 
subsequent takeover mission through MINUSMA demonstrated a lack of 
acknowledgement of [ECOWAS] ongoing regional counterterrorism efforts in Mali.”182 
Although AFISMA was short-lived, it was a success story because it helped in the 
liberation of Northern Mali from terrorist occupation. On AFISMA’s successes, Strydom 
notes that “AFISMA forces assisted, with the help of the French forces, in restoring Mali’s 
territorial integrity after the Tuareg rebellion and the subsequent military coup.”183 
However, AFISMA was financially handicapped, and the international donors propped up 
its operations. On AFISMA’s funding, Maru states, “another serious challenge for 
AFISMA will be insufficient and unpredictable funding for its operations and fight against 
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organized crime particularly by blocking arm supplies, ammunition, and combat materials 
in Azawad.”184  
2. Intelligence Gathering and Border Management 
The AU member states gather and share intelligence on security matters of concern 
within member states. While Mali’s intelligence practices appear to be limited, the AU’s 
intelligence practices are extensive, at least regarding scope, considering the number of 
countries in the African continent. The AU has established specialized agencies—for 
example, CISSA—and fusion centers for intelligence sharing between and among states. 
According to the African Union, CISSA comprises intelligence agencies and security 
services in Africa and was established primarily to “provide the African Union 
Commission (AUC) and its Member Services with timely and insightful intelligence, 
which would assist them in making informed decisions.”185 Also, the AU has launched the 
Nouakchott Process to assemble Heads of Intelligence agencies and competent ministers 
of the Sahel Region to brainstorm and address issues of security in the Sahel. On one such 
meeting, intelligence operatives reiterated the need for timely intelligence sharing and the 
importance of cooperation and conduct of activities to develop intelligence and security 
operatives’ capacity.186 On intelligence sharing, Matei and Halladay asset that “the need 
for intelligence sharing among democracies also arises from the fact that security and 
intelligence are no longer the exclusive purview of the national government.”187  
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On border control and management, the AU has a draft border strategy that 
identifies areas of intervention to enhance border management of its member states.188 The 
draft border strategy directs inter-state and inter-agency collaboration to mitigate threats to 
security of its member countries.189 When approved, its effective implementation requires 
resources for training and logistics. Meanwhile, joint integrated border security patrols are 
carried out, including a novel integrated border patrol comprising the Malian Armed 
Forces, former 2012 insurgents, France’s Operation Barkhane, and UN peacekeepers.190 
The border patrol was meant to diffuse tension between the government of Mali and former 
insurgents in order to promote peace in Mali.191 According to Justice Info Net, quoting 
Daniel on the significance of the exercise in integrating the parties in the 2012 civil conflict, 
“trust will be restored, because the armed groups will be obliged to sleep together, make 
tea together, go and meet the people.” However, although it has been about five years since 
that joint border patrol took place, much remains to be done to address challenges at the 
border. According to Solomon, who quotes a West African director at Human Rights 
Watch (Dufka), Mali’s border with Niger and Burkina Faso suffers from inter-communal 
conflicts between nomadic and agrarian groups that have necessitated the establishment of 
ethnically based civil defense groups (CDGs). The establishment of a CDG can be parallel 
to state security forces if not under the supervision and control of state security forces. 
Also, its establishment can result in inter-ethnic conflicts where the different ethnic groups 
in a community establish a CDG. 
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter indicated that the regional bodies have done much and can do better 
in the drive to combat terrorism in Mali soon. The African regional bodies have enacted 
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policies from which counterterrorism programs have been designed. These policies, which 
reflect demands of the UN, have resulted in monthly reports to determine waves of 
terrorism, perpetrators, and extent of fatalities, and the findings have been used to respond 
to the threat.  
The regional organizations have employed a two-track approach—dialogue and 
negotiations and combat operations—to lessen Mali’s terrorism, from which dialogue and 
negotiations are more successful for stabilizing Mali, restoring state governance, and 
integrating insurgents in the community. Dialogue and negotiations are arguably more 
appropriate in resolving insurgencies because insurgents can easily be reached for 
negotiation. The strategies of the regional bodies (dialogue and negotiations and combat 
operations) are related to the hypothesis of this thesis, which stipulates that regional 
organizations with established policies and strategies that include intelligence sharing, 
inter-state collaboration, and harmonized border security procedures mitigate terrorism. 
The various components in the hypothesis—policies, intelligence sharing, and inter-state 
collaboration—are evident in the regional approach that has helped lessen Mali’s threats. 
For example, there was intelligence sharing as manifested in the activities of CISSA and 
inter-state collaboration as was experienced in support received from such neighboring 
states as Algeria and Burkina Faso that presided in diplomacy and dialogue. The 
composition of the integrated regional force is also inter-state and therefore very 
appropriate.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis sought to identify what regional organizations can do differently to 
combat the threats of terrorism in the Sahel Region more effectively. It finds that the 
regional response to Mali’s security situation—where the threats are also largely 
regional—has been more successful over the long run than Mali’s domestic measures for 
a variety of reasons that have implications for all the states of the Sahel. This investigation 
found that regionalism has cut off supply routes, killed terrorists, and enhanced border 
security management. Based on these findings, this chapter provides some regionally 
focused recommendations and conclusions. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter suggests six areas—severe penalties for unconstitutional changes of 
government, incorporation of key stakeholders in mediation efforts, joint standby military 
force, SSR, training of intelligence operatives, and border security—that regional 
organizations can address in their efforts to curtail the extent of terrorism Mali faces. In 
each of these areas, the gaps that necessitated the proposed action have been factored to 
justify the proposed action.  
1. Severe Penalties for Unconstitutional Changes of Government 
This thesis found that Mali’s armed forces toppled the democratically elected 
government of Mali twice in a decade (2012 and 2020) in the midst of terrorist threats, and 
the likelihood exists that the armed forces will either repeat the practice or that neighboring 
Sahelian states will follow the practice and compromise security of the Sahel if the regional 
bodies do not institute stringent measures against the act. The regional bodies should revisit 
the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
government 2000 (Lomé Declaration) to severely punish those who topple democratically 
elected governments. On coups, the Lomé Declaration affirms that “these developments 
[coups] are a threat to peace and security of the continent and constitute a disturbing trend 
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and serious setback to the on-going process of democratization in the continent.”192 Yet in 
2012, Mali’s armed forces toppled the democratic leadership and formed a government 
that repressed the people. The junta government indulged in human rights abuses against 
those opposed to their leadership. In 2020, another coup was staged, but ECOWAS 
diplomatically forced the coupists to establish an interim government with a civilian 
leadership. Military coups are manifestations of unconstitutionality, unprofessionalism, 
and dictatorship, as the constitution is suspended. Given the undemocratic and repressive 
nature of military regimes, the AU and ECOWAS should revisit the Lomé Declaration to 
include long prison sentences for those who oust democratically elected regimes instead of 
the sanctions and travel bans imposed that mostly affect states and the innocent citizenry. 
2. Incorporation of Key Stakeholders in Peace Mediations  
This research found that key stakeholders were excluded from peace mediations 
whose contributions could have helped broaden and make peace agreements holistic and 
acceptable. Incorporating stakeholders in dialogue to resolve armed crises can lead to 
widened views on the nature and mode of a crisis, facilitating amicable and lasting 
resolutions. It is likely that the presence of key stakeholders, e.g., civil society, would have 
enriched the discussions, given their neutrality and sincerity of purpose. Therefore, to 
resolve Mali’s crisis, including future crises in the Sahel, the regional bodies should 
incorporate victims and civil society’s representatives at diplomatic negotiations as 
independent actors whose points of view and neutrality might create more amicable 
negotiations. Additionally, regional bodies can explore the possibility of incorporating 
interreligious organizations in peace agreements, given their reverence and acceptance.  
3. Establishment of Joint Standby Military Force 
This research found that the establishment of regional standby forces was ad hoc 
and so not prompt in responding to Mali’s 2012 insurgency. Regionalism’s operational 
responses to Mali’s threats of terrorism, though evident, are remiss for delaying to establish 
 
192 OAU, “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government,” 1.  
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a standby force that can be called upon for action on short notice. Establishment of a 
regional standby force, specifically one in each of the regions, has long been endorsed but 
not implemented. If the regional force is established, funds for its operations can be 
obtained from AU member states and donor partners. However, if regional organizations 
are unable to raise the required funds for the establishment of the regional standby force, 
the option is to maintain the ad hoc integrated forces assembled on a case-by-case basis to 
respond to threats. 
While the establishment of the standby forces seems appropriate considering the 
vastness of the continent and the volume of threats the continent faces, it will be fitting to 
start with one as an experiment and gradually establish the others based on the availability 
of funds. However, while it is likely that the Sahel Region of West Africa is the most threat-
prone as a result of its volume of terrorist threats, it will be prudent for the AU to do threat 
assessments to determine the most vulnerable region for the establishment of the maiden 
standby force, and the same analysis should be replicated to determine the manner in which 
subsequent standby forces will be built. Regional organizations can solicit support for the 
standby force from donors and their international partners.  
4. Undertaking Security Sector Reforms 
Overall, the research found that Malian security operatives were weak and 
incompetent in the execution of duties, as evidenced in their defeat and retreat from 
northern Mali in the 2012 insurgency, and unprofessional, as manifested in the breach of 
ethical standards. Certainly, unprofessional practices can compromise Mali’s security, 
especially when carried out at border posts. Hence, regional bodies should explore the 
possibility of obtaining funds for Mali to undertake SSR to make Mali’s security sector 
operatives more disciplined, trustworthy, and efficient in the execution of duty. Moreover, 
Mali’s SSR should target state institutions that uphold national security, for example 
primary security forces, security management and oversight bodies, intelligence agencies, 
and national security coordination. While Mali’s SSR can help transform its security sector 
institutions and maximize their efficiency, it is imperative that the sector be subjected to 
civilian coordination to enhance democratic oversight and control of the Malian security 
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forces. With SSR, security sector practitioners will be transformed to adhere to the ethos 
of the security sector.  
5. Training of Intelligence Officers  
The research found Mali’s rate of terrorism to be the highest in the Sahel, indicating 
widespread intelligence failures. Terrorists attack Mali regularly and have attacked the 
various components, mainly local armed forces, international military officers, and the civil 
populace. Hence, it seems that regional and local intelligence officers have either not 
gathered the correct intelligence or have failed in their intelligence analyses. According to 
Dahl, who talks about the importance of analysis to the overall intelligence successes, 
intelligence can fail “if analysts fail to understand signals and warnings that were right in 
front of them all the time.”193 Dahl notes that analysts refer “to this problem as inability 
on the part of intelligence authorities to ‘connect the dots’ of existing information.”194 
Similarly, intelligence can fail when analysis “become so dependent on data that it misses 
important tangibles.”195 Intelligence can also fail if only a handful of intelligence officers 
can speak a foreign language.196 To address these problems and improve the overall 
intelligence actions undertaken to secure Mali, the AU can, through CISSA, train 
intelligence personnel in Mali and the Sahel Region of West Africa to capacitate them on 
how to gather, debrief, and analyze intelligence. Training is significant to capacitate 
intelligence officers to perform effectively. The AU’s training programs can incorporate 
such common international languages as French, English, and Arabic, among others, to 
enhance intelligence practices. Additionally, intelligence officers should be trained in the 
culture of host countries so as to integrate and gather intelligence more easily.  
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6. Border Security and Management 
The research found that the Sahelian border conceals terrorists that navigate it to 
unleash terror on their targets. The Sahelian border is mostly unmanned or policed by ill-
equipped and unprofessional security operatives that cannot effectively execute their roles 
because of the regional nature of the border. Therefore, the border provides haven for 
terrorists and is a contributing factor to the spate of terrorism Mali faces. To address this 
problem, this thesis recommends that the regional bodies should harmonize border security 
practices with regard to movements of people and goods across the Sahelian border. 
Additionally, there should be border patrols and surveillance. On border patrols, Sahelian 
states should simultaneously undertake patrols at their portion of the border. On 
surveillance, security operatives should serve as watch dogs in gathering and sharing of 
intelligence with their counterparts in the Sahel, while the regional bodies should monitor 
the process to ensure its effectiveness. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Regionalism has helped promote state governance across the length and breadth of 
Mali and paved the way for Mali’s electoral processes. Insurgents had temporarily 
occupied northern Mali after defeating the Malian armed forces and chasing their allies, 
the Tuareg, out of northern Mali. The insurgents’ occupation of northern Mali was brief 
but characterized by repression as the shariah law was manifested. That said, collaborative 
efforts of integrated regional forces and French troops liberated and restored democratic 
governance in northern Mali to depict their strength and capability of defeating the 
Islamists. Additionally, because of peace mediation efforts, regional efforts have paved the 
way for the electoral process, resulting in the 2013 presidential elections. While these 
successes are noteworthy, terrorist attacks are intermittent, thereby necessitating more 
regional efforts to consolidate and improve on gains obtained.  
Regionalism has unified the conflicting parties—the government of Mali and some 
insurgents—through peace mediation efforts. Peace negotiations provided the forum for 
airing and addressing the grievances and concerns of the conflicting parties, resulting in 
the signing of peace accords, some of which are currently being rolled out. However, 
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regionalism not only deliberates mediations but also monitors implementation of 
agreements. In this regard, regionalism has organized joint border security patrols of the 
parties that signed the 2015 accord to build their confidence and trust in the accord. That 
said, joint border security patrols remain significant in monitoring Mali’s borders to 
identify and address border practices that are inimical to Mali and its neighbors in the Sahel. 
Regionalism has cut off terrorist supply routes and, in the process, decapitated 
terrorists and secured large caches of arms and ammunition. Eliminating supply routes is a 
step to limit the flow of arms for attacks on Mali. To consolidate these gains and locate 
unidentified or newly created supply routes, regionalism should strengthen reconnaissance 
activities and increase border security patrols while intelligence practitioners should be 
proactive to unearth terrorist moves.  
Finally, regionalism has created a training ground to develop the capacity of 
military practitioners in their constituencies. Routine combat and defensive activities of 
joint regional operational forces have enhanced their competences for future anti-terrorist 
activities either regionally or domestically. However, the extent to which the capacity of 
the joint regional forces will be developed is dependent on the extent of threats mitigated 
while on operations and the extent of exposure of regional forces to various types of 
weapons and equipment. Therefore, it is imperative that the required weapons and gadgets 
be provided to enhance activities of joint regional operational forces and develop their 
capacities for subsequent operations.  
59 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Africa Dense Forum. “Making Sense of the Sahel.” Defense Web. November 3, 2020. 
https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/making-sense-of-the-
sahel/. 
African Globe. “Arab Terrorists Forcibly Recruiting Children in Mali.” August 17, 2012. 
https://www.africanglobe.net/africa/arab-terrorists-forcibly-recruiting-children-
mali/.  
African Union. “The African Union and The European Union Join Forces For Ensuring 
Peace In Africa.” March 17, 2020. Https://Au.Int/En/Pressreleases/20200317/
Africa-Union-And-European-Union-Join-Forces-Ensuring-Peace-Africa.  
æææ. “Draft African Union Strategy for Enhancing Border Management In Africa,” 
Peace and Security Department. 2012. http://www.peaceau.org/Uploads/Au-Dsd-
Workshop-March-2013/Border-Programme-Docs/Au-Bm-Strategy-
Revised%20draft.Pdf. 
æææ. “The African Union Welcomes the Signing of the Preliminary Agreement to the 
Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali.” Peace and Security 
Department. June 18, 2013. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-mali-18-
06-2013.pdf.  
æææ. Inauguration of the Headquarters of the Committee of Intelligence and Security 
Services, Presented at the 33rd AU Summit, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, February 9, 
2020. https://au.int/en/newsevents/20200209/inauguration-headquarters-
committee-intelligence-and-security-services-cissa. 
æææ. The Monthly Africa Terrorism Bulletin 1st-31st July 2020 (Mohammadia, 
Algeria: Africa Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism, July 2020). 
https://caert.org.dz/Medi-review/Terrorism-bulletin/BULLETIN-July-20.pdf. 
æææ. Progress Report on the Implementation of the Conclusions of the Nouakchott 
Ministerial Meeting of 17 March 2013. Presented at Ministerial Meeting, 
Ndjamena, Chad, September 11, 2013. https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-
report-ndjamena-ministerial-meeting-11-09-2013.pdf.  
African Union Peace and Security Department. The African Union Counterterrorism 
Framework. November 23, 2015. http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-
terrorism-ct. 
Ag Anara, Sulemane. “Mali Soldiers, Armed Groups Hold First Joint Patrol in Northern 
Town.” Reuters. February 23, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/Us-Mali-
Security-Iduskbn1621l6. 
60 
Albrecht, Peter, Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, and Rikke Haugegaard, DIIS Policy Brief, 
Inequality in MINUSMA #2: An Uninterrupted Resource: African Forces in 
Intelligence Gathering. Denmark: Royal Danish Institute for International 
Studies, January 2017. file:///C:/Users/samuel/Downloads/
Minusma_inequality_2_WEB%20(2).pdf. 
Associated Press. “Mali Says Several Extremists Killed in New Military Offensive in 
Troubled Central Region.” ABC News. November 12, 2019. 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/mali-extremists-dead-military-
offensive-66943912. 
Badale, Raul-Ionut, and Diana-Cristina Isvoranu. “Mali. Conflict Analysis.” Conflict 
Studies Quarterly, no. 3 (April 2013): 3−20. http://cscubb.ro/csq/wp-content/
uploads/CSQ-3.-Badale-Isvoranu.pdf.  
Bakrania, Shivit. Conflict Drivers, International Responses, and the Outlook for Peace in 
Mali: A Literature Review. GSDRC Issues Paper. Birmingham, UK: University of 
Birmingham, January 31, 2013. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/ip14.pdf.  
Barbieri, Giovanni. “Regionalism, Globalism and Complexity: A Stimulus Towards 
Global IR?” Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 4, no. 6 (November 2019): 
424–441, 10.1080/23802014.2019.1685406. 
Barnes, Catherine. “An International Review Of Peace Initiatives.” Accord 13. London, 
UK: Conciliation Resources, 2002. https://Rc-Services-Assets.S3.Eu-West-
1.Amazonaws.Com/S3fs-Public/Owning_The_Process_Public_Participation_In
_Peacemaking_Accord_Issue_13.Pdf 
æææ. “Owning the Process: Public Participation in Peacemaking Featuring South 




Blake, James. “Radical Islamists Have Opened a New Front in Mali.” FP News. March 
29, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/29/radical-islamists-have-opened-a-
new-front-in-mali/. 
Boas, Morten, and Mats Utas. “Introduction: Post-Gaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel 
and West Africa.” Strategic Review for Southern Africa 35, no. 2 (November 
2013): 3–15. https://www.up.ac.za/media/shared/Legacy/sitefiles/file/46/1322/
04boasandutaspp315.pdf 
Boeke, Sergei. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism, Insurgency, or Organized 
Crime?” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27, no. 5 (2016): 914–936. DOI: 10.1080/
09592318.2016.1208280. 
61 
Borzel, Tanja A., and Thomas Risse. “Grand Theories of Integration and the Challenges 
of Comparative Regionalism.” Journal of European Public Policy 26, no. 8 
(2019):1231-1252. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2019.1622589,1239. 
Batware, Billy. The African Standby Force: A Solution to African Conflicts?. 
Stadtschlaining, Austria: European Peace University, December, 19, 2011. 
https://Acuns.Org/Wp-Content/Uploads/2012/06/Africanstandbyforce.Pdf.  
Baudais, Virginie. “The Impact of the Malian Crisis on the Group of Five Sahel 




Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. International Religious Freedom 
Report for 2018. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State. 
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MALI-2018-
INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf. 
Burke, Jason.”Jihadists Kill Scores of Soldiers in Mali Attack.” The Guardian. 
November 2, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/02/dozens-
killed-in-mali-jihadist-attack 
Caparini, Marian. “DDR and SSR Challenges in Mali.” Research Gate. May 2015. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
282613572_DDR_and_SSR_Challenges_in_Mali/citation/download 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jamaat Nasr al- Islam Wal Muslimin. 
Washington, DC: CSIS, September 5, 2018. https://www.csis.org/programs/
transnational-threats-project/terrorism-backgrounders/jamaat-nasr-al-islam-wal-
muslimin. 
æææ. “Mapping Militants: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.” Stanford University. 
Last updated July 2018. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/
aqim#highlight_text_7741.  
æææ. “Mapping Militants: CISAC-MMP: MUJAO.”  Last updated June 2018. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/mujao. 
Clausing, Kimberley. Open the Progressive Case for Free Trade, Immigration, and 
Global Capital. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009.  
Cline, Lawrence E. “Trying to Coordinate Force in the Sahel: The G5 Sahel.” Small Wars 
Journal. October 26, 2020. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/trying-
coordinate-force-sahel-g5-sahel.  
62 
Cooke, Jennifer G. “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building 
Regional Security?” Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 15, 
2017. https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-
terror-building-regional-security. 
Council of the European Union. “EU-Africa Relations, How Do African Countries and 
The EU Cooperate?” October 20, 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
Policies/Eu-Africa/. 
Counter Extremism Project. “Mali: Extremism and Counter-Extremism.” March 7, 2016. 
1, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/country_pdf/ML-
06082020.pdf. 
Dahl, Erik. Intelligence and Surprise Attack: Failure and Success from Pearl Harbor to 
9/11 and Beyond. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013. 
Daily Mail. “Man Lashed 40 times for Drinking Alcohol as Extremists Tighten Grips on 
Mali.” July 16, 2020. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2174399/The-
Islamic-group-imposing-strict-sharia-law-whipping-people-destroying-
shrines.html. 
Danish Demining Group. “Border Security Needs Assessment: Summary Laptako-
Gourma Region: Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.” Reliefweb. July 2014. 
https://Reliefweb.Int/Sites/Reliefweb.Int/Files/Resources/
Bsna%20summary%20eng%202014.Pdf. 
Dao, Elisee Jean. “Learning from U.S. Counterterrorism Experience in the Sahel: A 
Springboard for the Sahel G5 Organization.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2019. http: hdl.handle.net/10945/60389. 
Dentice, Giuseppe. “Terrorism in the Sahel Region: An Evolving Threat on Europe’s 
Doorstep.” Euro Mesco Policy Brief, No. 80 (February 19, 2018): 1–14. 
https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Brief80_Terrorism-in-
the-Sahel-Region.-An-evolving-threat-on-Europe-doorstepA.pdf. 
Deutsche Welle. “Mali: Alleged Timbuktu Destroyer to Appear at International Criminal 
Court.” January 4, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/mali-alleged-timbuktu-
destroyer-to-appear-at-international-criminal-court/a-43212936.  
Devermont, Jude, and Marielle Harris. “Why Mali Needs A New Peace Deal.” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. April 15, 2020. https://www.csis.org/analysis/
why-mali-needs-new-peace-deal. 
Dicko, Imam Mahmud. “The Powerful Mullah that Caused Mali’s Coup.” PM News. 
August 22, 2019. https://www.pmnewsnigeria.com/2020/08/22/imam-mahmoud-
dicko-the-powerful-mullah-that-caused-malis-coup/. 
63 
Dunphy, Hannah. “How a Transitional Justice Expert Helped Mali Confront Its Legacy 
of War.” The New Humanitarian. May 21, 2018. 
https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/peacebuilding/community/2018/05/21/
how-a-transitional-justice-expert-helped-mali-confront-its-legacy-of-war. 
Durmaz, Mucahid. “Libya in the African Context.” TRT World Magazine. January 24, 
2020. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/libya-in-the-african-context-33208.  
Editorial Staff. “Arab Terrorists Forcibly Recruiting Children in Mali.” African Globe. 
August 17, 2012. https://www.africanglobe.net/africa/arab-terrorists-forcibly-
recruiting-children-mali/.  
Ellison, Soyia, and Ntole Kazadi. “Mali Independent Observer Releases Third 
Report on Implementation of the Peace Agreement.” The Carter Center. 
February 22, 2019. https://cartercenter.org/news/pr/mali-022219.html. 
Encyclopedia of Nations. “Mali-Ethnic Groups.” Accessed August 10, 2020, 
https://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Mali-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html.  
Ero, Comfort. “The Problems with ‘African Solutions.’” Internal Crisis Group. December 
2, 2013. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/problems-african-solutions.  
Fox News. “Couple Stoned to Death in Northern Mali: Accused of Affair.” May 24, 
2017. https://www.foxnews.com/world/couple-stoned-to-death-in-northern-mali-
accused-of-affair. 
France 24. “Military Appointed to Key Posts in Mali’s Interim Government.” October 5, 
2020. https://www.france24.com/en/20201005-military-appointed-to-key-posts-
in-mali-s-interim-govt. 
Francis, David J. The Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali. 




GIABA. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Measures: Mali, 
Mutual Evaluation Report. Dakar, Senegal: GIABA, November 2019. 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer-fsrb/GIABA-Mutual-
Evaluation-Mali-2019.pdf. 
æææ. Mission and Vision. Accessed August 15, 2020. https://www.giaba.org/. 
Global Security.”Tuareg-Mali − 1990–1996.” Accessed August 3, 2020. 
https://Www.Globalsecurity.Org/Military/World/War/Tuareg-Mali-1990.Htm. 
64 
Gold, Rick. “Initiatives for Peace in Northern Mali in the 1990s Lessons Learned.” A 
Contrario International Criminal Law. February 13, 2013. 
https://acontrarioicl.com/tag/tamanrasset-accord/ 
Gruel, Jean, and Wil Hout. “Regionalism across the North-South Divide, States 
Strategies and Globalization.” London: Routledge, 1999. 
https://www.amazon.com/Regionalism-across-North-South-Divide-ebook/dp/
B000SJWUHO. 
Harmon, Stephen. “Securitization Initiatives in the Sahara-Sahel Region in the Twenty-
first Century.” African Security 8, no. 4 (2015): 227–248. DOI: 10.1080/
19392206.2015.1100503.  
Hoije, Katarina. “Mali Conflict: South is South, North is North, Never the Twain Shall 
Meet?” The Guardian. March 19, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/mar/19/mali-conflict-south-north-divide-algiers-peace-talks. 
Human Rights Watch. “Attacks on Students, Teachers and Schools, Surge in Africa 
Sahel.” September 8, 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/08/attacks-
students-teachers-and-schools-surge-africas-sahel# 
æææ. “Mali: Rising Ethnic Tensions Threatens New Violence.” December 12, 2012. 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/20/mali-rising-ethnic-tensions-threaten-new-
violence. 
International Crisis Group. Drug Trafficking, Violence and Politics in Northern Mali, 
ICG Report No. 267/Africa. Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 
2018.  
æææ. “Mali: An Imposed Peace?” July 1, 2015. https://www.crisisgroup.org/mali-s-
peace-deal-represents-welcome-development-will-it-work-time. 
Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact 
of Terrorism. Sydney, Australia: IEP, November 2019. https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/GTI-2019web.pdf 
International Sector Advisory Team. Mali’s SSR Background Advisory Note. Geneva, 
Switzerland: Center for Security Sector Governance, November 2, 2019. 
https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Country-Profiles/Mali-SSR-
Background-Note.  
Jezequel, Jean Herve. “Central Mali: Putting a Stop to Ethnic Cleansing.” International 
Crisis Group. March 25, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/
centre-du-mali-enrayer-le-nettoyage-ethnique.  
65 
æææ. “Mali’s Peace Deal Represents Welcome Development But Will It Work This 
Time?” The Guardian. July 1, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/jul/01/mali-peace-deal-a-welcome-development-but-will-it-
work-this-time. 
Justice Info. “Joint Patrols in View for Northern Mali.” October 31, 2015. 
https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/Reconciliation/2783-Joint-Patrols-In-View-For-
Northern-Mali.Html. 
Kelly, Fergus. “Mali: 17-Day Operation Combined 1,400 Troops from France, the G5 
Sahel Joint Force, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” The Defense Post. November 
18, 2019. https://www.thedefensepost.com/2019/11/18/Joint-Operation-Burkina-
Faso-Mali-Barkhane-Bourgou-Iv-Sahel/.  
Koepf, Tobias. Stuck in the Desert: Negotiations on Northern Mali. Brussels, Belgium: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2013. 
Lebovich, Andrew. The Local Face of Jihadism in Northern Mali, Volume 6, Issue 6, 
June 2013. https://ctc.usma.edu/the-local-face-of-jihadism-in-northern-mali/.  
æææ. “Sacred Struggles: How Islam Shapes Politics in Mali.” European Council on 
Foreign Relations. November 2019. https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-
/Secular_stagnation_malis_relationship_religion.pdf. 
Lecocq, Baz, Gregory Mann, Bruce Whitehouse, Dida Badi, Lotte Pelckmans, Nadia 
Belalimat, Bruce Hall, and Wolfram Lacher. “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind 
Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided 
Republic of Mali.” Review of African Political Economy 40, no. 137 (June 9, 
2013): 343−357. DOI: 10.1080/03056244.2013.799063. 
Le Roux, Pauline. “Confronting Central Mali’s Extremist Threat.” Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies. February 22, 2019. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/
confronting-central-malis-extremist-threat/. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence from Secrets to Policy, 8th Ed. (London, UK: Sage, 
2020). 
Lyammouri, Rida. Northern Mali: Armed Groups, State Failure, and Terrorism, HSPI 
Issue Brief 20. Washington, DC: George Washington University, 2013. 
https://www.slideshare.net/RobSentseBc/northern-mali-armed-groups-state-
failure-and-terrorism.  
Maiangwa, Benjamin. “Jihadism in West Africa: Adopting a Three-Dimensional 
Approach to Counterterrorism.” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development 9, no. 
3 (December 1, 2014): 17−32. DOI: 10.1080/15423166.2014.984559.  
66 
Maiga, Adama Mahamane. “Challenges to Reforming Intelligence Agencies in Re-
Democratizing Countries: The Case of Mali.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60432. 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Etel Solingen. “Regionalism.” Annual Review of Political 
Science 13, no. 1 (June 2010): 145–163, 10.1146/
annurev.polisci.13.050807.161356. 
Maru, Mehari Taddele. African-Led International Support Mission in Mali: Military 
Ahead of Politics. Doha, Qatar: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 14, 2013. 
https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports/documents/
2013214835996734AFISMA_MilitaryaheadofPolitics.pdf.  
Matei, Florina Christiana. “The Case of Mali.” In Security Forces in African States Cases 
and Assessments. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Carolyn Halladay. The Conduct of Intelligence In 
Democracies, Processes, Practices And Cultures. Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2019.  
McKeever, Matthew. “Regional Institutions and Social Development in Southern 
Africa,” Annual Review of Sociology 34, no. 1 (August 2008): 453–473, 
https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134645. 
Meyer, Peter J. Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress, 
CRS Report No. R42639. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2018. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42639.pdf.  
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Movement 
for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa.” Tracking Terrorism. 2015. Accessed 
August 10, 2020. https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/movement-unity-and-
jihad-west-africa-mujao. 
Neary, Patrick C. The Post–9/11 Intelligence Community, Intelligence Reform, 2001–




Nyesiga, Nicholas Humble. “Combating Transnational Terrorism in the East African 
Region: The Role of the African Union Mission in Somalia.” Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/55509. 
OAU. “OAU Charter.” 1963. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7759-file-
oau_charter_1963.pdf. 
67 
æææ. “OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.” July 11, 
2003. https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/37289-treaty-0020_-
_oau_convention_on_the_prevention_and_combating_of_terrorism_e.pdf,5.  
æææ. “Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government, AHG/Dec 1.5 (XXXV1).” Slide Share. June 9, 2019. 
https://www.slideshare.net/DesireAssogbavi/lome-declaration-coup. 
Obair, Philip. “Here’s How Terrorists Recruit Africa’s Children.” Daily Beast. January 
21, 2016. https://www.thedailybeast.com/heres-how-terrorists-recruit-africas-
children?ref=scroll. 
Panapress. “Eight Civilians Killed in Alleged Terrorist Attack in Central Mali.” 
November 5, 2020. https://www.panapress.com/Eight-civilians-killed-in-allege-
a_630667002-lang2.html. 
Parmentier, Audrey, and Philipp Sandner. “Mali Peace Deal Raises Hopes of Stability.” 
Deutsche Welle. June 20, 2015. https://www.dw.com/en/mali-peace-deal-raises-
hopes-of-stability/a-18527239. 





Relief Web. “Transitional Justice in Mali: Opportunities and Challenges.” May 25, 
2015. https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/transitional-justice-mali-opportunities-
and-challenges.  
Safe Airspace. “Conflict Zone and Risk Database.” Accessed August 15, 2020. 
https://safeairspace.net/mali/. 
Sangare, Bokar, and Ephrem Rugiririza. “Malian Victims to Get a Voice for a Day.” 
Justice Info. December 6, 2019. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/truth-
commissions/43146-malian-victims-to-get-a-voice-for-a-day.html. 
Interagency OPSEC Support Group. Security Operations Intelligence Handbook. 
Greenbelt, MD: Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, May 1996. https://fas.org/irp/
nsa/ioss/threat96/part02.htm. 
Sheehan, Michael A, and Geoff D. Porter. “The Future Role of U.S. Counterterrorism 




Solomon, Salem. “Experts Warn Mali Border Violence Could Spiral Out of Control.” 
VOA. June 29, 2019. https://www.voanews.com/Africa/Experts-Warn-Mali-
Border-Violence-Could-Spiral-Out-Control.  
Shurkin, Michael, Stephanie Pezard, and S. Rebecca Zimmerman. Mali’s Next Battle 
Improving Counterterrorism Capabilities. Report No. RR1241. Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand Corporation, 2017. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1241.html. 
Smith, Alex Duval. “Inside Mali’s Human Trafficking Underworld in Gao.” BBC News. 
April 21, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32359142. 
Soderbaum, Frederik, and Andrew Grant. “New Regionalism in Africa.” Research Gate. 
January 2003. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
259580724_New_Regionalism_in_Africa. 
Sow, Brehima. “The Rise of Terrorism in Mali: A Review of The Historical Causes and 
the Failures of Both Malian And International Efforts.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/61275. 
Strydom, Hennie. “Mali and the Sahel: Making Peace in Another Rough Neighborhood.” 
Netherlands International Law Review 66 (April 2019):75-99. DOI: 10.1007/
s40802-019-00134-6.  
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. “Terrorism 
in Mali,” 2015. https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/
START_MaliFactSheet_Nov2015.pdf. 
Tih, Felix. “Mali’s Interim Premier Announces 25 Member Cabinet.” Anadolu Agency. 
October 6, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/malis-interim-premier-
announces-25-member-cabinet/1996920# 
Trading Economics. “Burkina Faso Terrorism Index 2002−2018 Data.” Accessed 
September 5, 2020. https://tradingeconomics.com/Burkina-Faso/Terrorism-Index. 
UCDP. Tamanrasset Accord, Agreement on Ceasing of Hostilities.. December 2, 1997. 
https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/mal19910106.pdf. 
Ulger, İrfan Kaya, and Joe Hammoura. “The Arab League: From Establishment to 
Failure.” Journal of Social and Legal Studies (July 2018): 35−55. 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/
326783428_The_Arab_League_From_Establishment_to_Failure.  
United Nations. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973), Annexed 
to General Assembly resolution 3166 (XVIII). New York: United Nations, 2005). 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_4_1973.pdf. 
69 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. A Review of the Legal Regime against 
Terrorism in West and Central Africa, Working Document. New York: United 




æææ. “UNODC on Money-Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.” 
September 5, 2002. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/
index.html. 
UN Secretary General. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, S/2016/
281. New York: United Nations, March 28, 2016.  https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/N1607793.pdf. 
æææ. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Sahel Region, S/2013/
354. New York: United Nations, 2013. https://unowas.unmissions.org/sites/
default/files/s_2013_354_sahel_strategy_en_0.pdf. 
UN Security Council. Stabilizing Mali, Tackling Terrorism in Sahel Region Hinges on 
Long-Term Plan, Sustained Support, Senior Peacekeeping Official Tells Security 
Council, SC/13351, 8266th Meeting. New York: United Nations, May 23, 2018. 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13351.doc.htm. 
U.S. Department of State. Country Reports on Terrorism 2017-Mali. Refworld. 
September 19, 2018. https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f94a.html. 
æææ. Country Reports on Terrorism, 2019, Mali. Washington, DC: Bureau of 
Counterterrorism, June 24, 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/
06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2.pdf.  
æææ. Mali 2018 International Religious Freedom Report. Washington, DC: Office of 
International Religious Freedom, May 2019. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/MALI-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-
REPORT.pdf. 
æææ. Mali 2019 International Religious Freedom Report. Washington, DC: Office of 
International Religious Freedom, June 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/MALI-2019-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-
REPORT.pdf. 
Van Vliet, Martin. “Weak Legislatures, Failing MPS, and the Collapse of Democracy in 
Mali.” African Affairs 113, no. 450 (2014): 45–66. doi: 10.1093/afraf/adt071.  
70 
Walter, Phil. “Ungoverned Spaces, What Threats Do They Pose?” Blogs of War. 
February 16, 2016. https://blogsofwar.com/ungoverned-spaces-what-threat-do-
they-pose/. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. London, UK: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979. 
Weiss, Caleb. “JNIM Targets Military Bases in Central Mali.” FDD’s Long War Journal. 
January 27, 2020. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/01/jnim-targets-
military-bases-in-central-mali.php.  
World Bank. Mali Poverty and Gender Notes. Report No. 77752-ML. Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2013. http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/
145431468281645332/pdf/777520ML0ESW0P00Box377382B00PUBLIC0.pdf 
World Data Atlas. Mali- Global Terrorism Index. Access August 10, 2020. 
https://knoema.com/atlas/Mali/topics/World-Rankings/World-Rankings/Global-
terrorism-index.  
York, Geoffrey. “Training of Mali Soldiers Said to Lack Values, Ethics and Military 
Ethos.” The Globe and Mali. January 25, 2013. 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/training-of-mali-soldiers-said-to-
lack-values-ethics-and-military-ethos/article7893675/.  
Zenishek, Steven G. “Sayyid Qutb’s “Milestones” and Its Impact on the Arab Spring.” 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
